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The Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary was first 
published in 1975.  The new association between 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the University of Strathclyde’s 
Business School provides the Fraser of Allander Institute 
with the support to continue the Commentary, and we 
gratefully acknowledge this support.  The Fraser of Allander 
Institute is a research unit within the Department of 
Economics at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow.  The 
Institute carries out research on the Scottish economy, 
including the analysis of short-term movements in economic 
activity.  Its researchers have an international reputation in 
modelling regional economies and in regional development.  
One-off research projects can be commissioned by private 
and public sector clients.  If you would like further 
information on the Institute’s research or services, please 
contact the Institute Administrator on 0141 548 3958 or 
email the Institute at fraser@strath.ac.uk. 
 
 
The Fraser of Allander Institute was established in 1975 as 
a result of a donation from the Hugh Fraser Foundation.  We 
gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the Buchanan 
and Ewing Bequest towards the publication costs of the 
Commentary.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PwC support the production of the Economic Commentary but have 
no control of its editorial content, including, in particular, the 
economic forecasts.  PwC produces its own regular review of UK 
and international economic prospects, the next issue of which is 
published on their website:  
http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/uk_economic_outlook.html
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Outlook 
and  
appraisal 
Overview 
 
  
There is a high probability that the Scottish 
economy will go into recession in 2009. 
Recession is the likely outcome of the global 
financial crisis, which was triggered by the 
collapse of the house price bubble, initially in 
the United States, massive foreclosures in 
the US sub-prime mortgage market, and 
significant bank and hedge fund losses 
across the globe as the value of innovative 
investments based on sub-prime mortgages 
collapsed.  The uncertain solvency of many 
financial institutions has generated a loss of 
confidence and trust in the banking system of 
sufficient scale to produce what one 
distinguished analyst and commentator has 
called the “consequent disintegration of the 
credit mechanism.”i 
 
An examination of previous recessions 
supports the view that cyclical fluctuations of 
Scottish GDP have less amplitude than in the 
UK economy. What this means is that the 
business cycle has tended to be effectively 
flatter in Scotland and so both upswings and 
downswings are less severe here than in the 
UK. We consider that the scale of the 
downturn confronting us will probably be less 
severe than the 1980/81 recession, 
principally because in that recession, 
monetary and fiscal policy effectively 
accommodated, even exacerbated, the 
recession and was not used counter-
cyclically to combat it.  That will not happen 
on this occasion as the recent swingeing cuts 
in interest rates in the UK and the US, and 
the willingness to borrow more and run up 
higher levels of public debt, indicate. 
However, we are less sure that the Scottish 
economy will weather the coming downturn 
better than the UK.  
 
The impact of the present crisis will depend 
on the scale of the deflation of house and 
property prices in the Scottish market, the 
extent of the impact on local financial service 
PAGE 4 VOLUME 32  NUMBER 2 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
activities, and the mechanism governing the 
spread to the wider Scottish economy. 
 
On the housing and property market effects, 
we judge that the absolute and relative fall in 
house prices is likely to be less in Scotland 
than in the UK. For this reason, and given 
also that the Scottish home ownership rate at 
66%, despite strong growth in the five years 
to 2006, continues to be lower than in the UK 
at 70%, we expect that the impact on the 
Scottish economy of the end of the house 
price boom will be less than in the UK. We 
take the view that the impact on banking and 
financial services will be bigger here than in 
the UK and that there may be a lingering 
negative effect in the long-term. This is 
because the scale of the losses on sub-prime 
and impairments facing the two principal 
Scottish banks, RBS and HBOS, are 
considerable and exceptional compared to 
other UK banks. The losses have pushed 
RBS and HBOS to the brink of bankruptcy. 
This outcome underlines the extent to which 
the lending behaviour of the two banks had 
ceased to be underpinned by the traditional 
risk management practices that had led 
Scottish banking/bankers to be perceived as 
prudent and even ‘canny’. 
 
The effect on the wider Scottish economy of 
the financial crisis will be mediated through 
the following key transmission mechanisms: 
direct demand; intermediate input demand; 
domestic household demand; external 
household demand; credit supply; inward 
investment; and confidence of businesses 
and consumers. Because of the heightened 
levels of uncertainty and the lack of evidence 
sufficient to give us a clear understanding of 
the strength and duration of the 
consequences for each of the transmission 
mechanisms noted above we publish a 
central or base forecast and three alternative 
scenarios. 
 
Our central forecast reveals that from 2007 
there will be five years of below trend growth 
and a fall in output, or recession in 2009. 
Scottish GDP growth will slow from 1.9% in 
2007 to 0.7% in 2008. In 2009, we project 
that GDP will fall by 1.1%, but recession will 
only be evident in that year as growth picks 
up again to 0.7% in 2010, 1.2% in 2011 and 
1.5% in 2012.  For the first time in quite a few 
years Scotland experiences net job losses, 
with over 4,000 lost in 2008, more than 
37,000 lost in 2009, and around 12,000 lost 
in 2010. In 2011, net jobs begin to be created 
again quite quickly with more than 14, 000 
net jobs, rising to net job creation of below 
24,000 in 2012. The scale of the initial job 
losses is sufficient to push up unemployment 
from the historically low levels that the 
Scottish economy has enjoyed over the past 
few years. Unemployment on the ILO 
measure increases from 117,300, or 4.4%, 
peaks at 162,300, or 6.1% in 2010 then falls 
to 151,000, or 5.7%, in 2011, falling further 
to137,300, or 5.2%, in 2012. 
 
On our optimistic scenario, financial and 
housing market impacts are less severe, 
lending behaviour picks up more quickly, 
confidence is re-established sooner, and 
monetary policy is a little more aggressive. 
Here GDP growth slows down in 2008 but by 
less than in the base case falling to 0.8%. 
Similarly, in 2009 the scale of the fall in GDP 
is slightly less at –1% rather than –1.1%. In 
2010, 2011 and 2012 there is a stronger 
recovery as growth rise to 1%, 1.6% and 
1.8% respectively, returning almost to trend 
by 2012. Job losses are also less in this case 
and the recovery in the labour market 
stronger. This has a more favourable impact 
on unemployment than in the base case. 
 
In the recession plus slow recovery case 
there is both a stronger downturn and slower 
recovery than in the central or base case. In 
this scenario, lowered confidence, 
depression in the housing market, 
contraction in the construction and financial 
service sectors are more severe than in the 
base case. Lending behaviour does not 
improve significantly from present levels, and 
monetary policy remains cautious after the 
recent rate cuts. GDP falls by – 1.2% in 2009 
there are considerable job losses of over 
46,000 and the ILO unemployment rate 
increases to 6.3%. Growth hardly recovers in 
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2010 as GDP expands by only 0.6%, nearly 
16,000 net jobs are lost and the 
unemployment rate increases further to 
6.4%. In 2011 and 2012 there is GDP growth 
of 1% and 1.2%, which are well below trend. 
Net jobs begin to be created in these final 
two years by 9,000 and 17,000 respectively 
and the unemployment rate recovers 
somewhat to 6.1% and 5.5%. 
 
Our final case is, a worst-case scenario of 
sustained recession. Here, the seizure of the 
financial system continues for an extended 
period, bank illiquidity persists, lending 
continues to be severely constrained, and 
business confidence remains low. A greater 
contraction in household and investment 
demand follows, leading to negative growth 
for two consecutive years of –1.6% in 2009 
and – 0.4% in 2010. Growth turns weakly 
positive at 0.3% in 2011 and continues no 
better than the 2008 expected growth rate of 
0.7% in 2012. Under this scenario net job 
losses are considerable as the downturn is 
sufficient to produce a shakeout of hoarded 
labour. Net employment falls by 73,000 in 
2009, and by 44,000 in 2010, with some 
improvement thereafter. ILO unemployment 
deteriorates to 6.5% in 2009, peaking at 
7.1% or 187,000 in 2010. In 2011 and 2012 
there is some improvement as the rate falls 
to 6.2% and 5.8%.  
 
 
GDP Performance in first quarter 2008 
 
The latest official outturn data for the Scottish economy refer 
to the second quarter 2008. Total Scottish gross value 
added at real basic prices rose by 0.1% in the quarter and 
by 1.8% over the year. The comparable UK figures were 
0.0% and 2.5%. So, Scotland’s exhibited a marginally 
stronger growth performance than the UK during the 
quarter, but essentially the UK economy was stagnating in 
the second quarter and Scotland’s performance was little 
different, as Figure 1 indicates. 
 
Service sector growth was weaker in Scotland during the 
quarter with an outturn of 0.1% here compared to 0.2% in 
the UK – see Figure 2. Over the year, Scottish and UK 
services grew at broadly the same rate of 3% and 3.1% 
respectively. 
 
Within Scottish services the sector performing the most 
strongly in the second quarter was transport & 
communication with growth of 2.6% compared to 1% in the 
UK. Retail & wholesale grew by 1.7% as against 0.7% in the 
UK and other services grew by 1% compared to zero growth 
in the UK. The remaining four aggregated service sectors 
for which data are published all cut back production in the 
quarter. Hotels & catering, financial services and real estate 
& business services all contracted by 1%, compared to 
mixed performance in their UK counterparts of – 1.9%, 0% 
and +0.2%. The public sector contracted slightly, by 0.1% in 
Scotland, compared to an increase of 0.1% in the UK. Over 
the year, other services grew most quickly at 7.6% (3% in 
the UK), followed by transport & communication 6.7% (1.9% 
in the UK), retail & wholesale 4.8% (2.9% in UK) and hotels 
and catering 0.5% (0.7% in the UK). Financial services was 
the weakest sector over the year, contracting by 4.8% 
compared to a 7.7% rise in the UK. 
 
Manufacturing in Scotland grew by 0.7% in the second 
quarter, in contrast to UK manufacturing, which cut back 
output by 0.9% - see Figure 3. While over the year, GVA in 
Scottish manufacturing rose by 0.7% compared to a rise of 
0.2% in the UK. 
 
Within manufacturing, the relatively stronger Scottish 
performance in the second quarter was driven by 
engineering, chemicals, and other manufacturing. In 
engineering, transport equipment grew by 3.9% (-4.4% over 
the year), mechanical engineering by 1.5% (5.3% over the 
year) and electronics by 0.8% (1.2% over the year). The 
comparable UK figures were, 1% (-0.7%) over the year, -
0.8% (3.6% over the year), and -2% (-0.6% over the year), 
respectively.  Chemicals & man-made fibres exhibited 
growth of 1.4% in Scotland in the second quarter, while 
contracting by 0.4% in the UK. Other manufacturing in 
Scotland grew by 0.9%, while its UK counterpart reduced 
output by 1.4%. At the other extreme the weakest 
manufacturing sectors in Scotland during the quarter were, 
paper, printing & publishing which contracted by 2.7% and 
by 3.2% over the year (-0.2% and 0.6% in the UK, and food 
& drink, which cut back output by 1.5% in the quarter but 
raised output by 3.2% over the year (-2.1% and -1.3% in the 
UK). 
 
Figure 4 brings together the GVA indexes for 10 key sectors 
that are, or have been, significant for the growth of the 
Scottish economy. The figure reveals the continuing 
strength in transport & communication services, the 
weakness in financial services since the 2007q1, the upturn 
in activity in retail & wholesale, and the turndown in hotels & 
catering, real estate & business services, and food & drink 
from 2008q1. 
 
Looking into the abyss 
 
It is now nearly 5 months since we last reported on the 
Scottish economy. Along with most analysts and forecasters 
we failed to anticipate the scale of the subsequent change 
and deterioration in the world economy generally and the 
financial markets specifically. We saw that the US economy 
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was teetering on the brink of recession and that with high 
and rising oil and commodity prices both the US and the 
developed economies faced the spectre of stagflation. We 
also saw the oil price rising further from the then $139 price 
peaking at close to $200 possibly within twelve months and 
then falling to a more sustainable level of $80 to $90 per 
barrel. But we were not sure of the timescale over which 
such a movement would occur. In the event the oil price 
peaked at $147 and has since fallen back to below, and now 
around, $70.  
 
Hence, in the short term, inflation is now much less of a 
problem, while the threat to demand and real output in both 
the US and the major economies, including the UK and 
Scotland, is much greater than we anticipated. On the key 
factors influencing the prospects for the real economy it is 
worth repeating what we said last time:  
 
“It is now well understood that the trigger events in 
the US slowdown stemmed principally from the 
housing market: ending of the house price boom; 
house price falls and higher interest rates; massive 
foreclosures in the sub-prime mortgage market; 
significant bank and hedge fund losses as the value 
of innovative investments based on sub-prime 
mortgages collapsed; and the subsequent drying up 
of liquidity in financial markets, or ‘credit crunch’ as it 
is now popularly known. The loss of trust occasioned 
by the sub-prime crisis has thrown a huge spoke in 
the wheel of the global financial system. Moreover, 
the credit crunch is exceptionally serious because 
……. the problem with the markets isn’t just a lack of 
liquidity, as in many previous financial crises, there’s 
also a fundamental problem of solvency that is still 
not fully identified. Scotland cannot be insulated from 
wider forces. What is still uncertain is the extent of 
the sub-prime losses in the global banking system 
and because of that the degree to which the financial 
system is pulling back from traditional lending 
activities. If that pull back is marked then there is little 
doubt that growth will slow considerably.” 
 
What we did not appreciate was that the collapse of the 
asset price bubble, which was what happened to the 
housing markets in the US and UK, would lead to insolvency 
in so many key financial institutions, the effective 
disintegration of the credit supply mechanism in the global 
economy, and a major pull back from traditional lending 
activities both between the banks and to the wider economy.  
 
There is now almost universal agreement – a possibly 
dubious phenomenon – that the ‘collapse’ of the housing 
market, the scale of the losses experienced by banks and 
other financial service sector firms, and the breakdown of 
credit supply are producing a slowdown in the ‘real’ 
economy of considerable severity. The likely size of such a 
slowdown for any economy is exceptionally difficult to call 
because it depends on the scale of the deflation of house 
and property prices in the domestic market, the scale of the 
impact on local financial service activities, and the spread to 
the wider domestic economy. 
 
Against the background of unprecedented upheaval in the 
financial sector, financial markets and the global economy 
generally, recent economic performance data on GVA and 
employment offer little or no guide to future outcomes. 
Forecasting becomes even more difficult at such times. 
However, we are not completely in the dark. There are 
some guidelines on which we can draw. 
 
First, to derive some sense of the prospects for the Scottish 
economy it is worth looking at what a recession has meant 
in UK and Scottish terms. This should provide a benchmark 
and perhaps framework against which the expected 
downturn can be set. We then turn to the property market 
impacts, the effect on financial services in Scotland, and 
finally, wider economy considerations. 
 
 
Lessons from previous recessions 
It has now become something of a stylised fact that cyclical 
fluctuations of Scottish GDP have less amplitude than in the 
UK economy. What this means is that the cycle is 
considered to be effectively flatter and so both upswings 
and downswings are less severe here. 
 
Figure 5 indicates that since 1963 there have been 3 severe 
recessions in the UK, defined here as a downturn sufficient 
to make annual growth negative for at least one year, in 
1974/75, 1980/81 and 1991. In the UK, there was a 
technical recession of two quarters in 1961 but it lasted no 
more than that. In 1974/75, there were 3 quarters with 
successive negative growth running from the third quarter 
1973, followed by negative growth in the fourth quarter of 
1974, then negative growth again in the second and third 
quarters of 1975. In 1980/81, the recession in the UK was 
altogether more severe both in terms of the scale of output 
contraction and its duration. Output fell by 2.8% and 1.4% 
respectively in 1980 and 1981 and growth was negative for 
5 successive quarters from the first quarter of 1980. 
However, it is worth noting that there was negative growth in 
the first and third quarters of 1979 too. Finally, in 1991 
growth turned negative in the third quarter of 1990 and 
negative growth continued for four further quarters, with 
GVA dropping by 1.5% in 1991 overall. 
 
So, severe recessions in the UK would appear to be 
associated with an annual fall in output of between 1.5% 
and 3% and a duration of negative growth lasting for 5 to 7 
quarters, although not necessarily consecutive quarters. 
 
The data in Figure 5 confirm the view that recessions have 
tended to be less severe in Scotland compared to the UK 
and in 1991 Scotland did not experience a recession. The 
reasons for this are complex reflecting the different structure 
of the Scottish economy, the behaviour of key actors in the 
economy and the source of the recession. Other things 
equal, a somewhat bigger public sector in Scotland and 
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fairly high levels of income compensating social security 
payments have helped the economy weather downturns in 
private sector market demand for goods and services. In 
addition, the higher Scottish household propensity to save 
has tended to relatively protect Scottish household 
expenditure from interest rate hikes as it did in 1991. 
Moreover, the lower degree of home ownership, lesser 
willingness to take on debt also helped Scotland to avoid 
recession in that year. 
 
So what help does this analysis provide in helping to 
forecast the scale of the expected downturn in both 
Scotland and the UK?  
 
We think it unlikely that the recession in prospect will be as 
severe as 1980/81, although we cannot say this with 
certainty. In that recession, monetary and fiscal policy 
effectively accommodated, even exacerbated, the recession 
and was not used counter-cyclically to combat it.  That will 
not happen on this occasion as the recent swingeing cuts in 
interest rates in the UK and the US, and the willingness to 
borrow more and run up higher levels of public debt, 
indicate. Yet, we are unsure about the scale of the 
exogenous demand shock that will hit the economy. A key 
source of the expected downturn is global rather than local 
in nature.  This is somewhat different from previous 
recessions and could make the outcome more severe than 
a recession due to a fall in domestic demand. 
 
Will Scotland suffer by more or less than the UK?  
The evidence is clear that recessions have tended to be 
weaker here for some of the reasons noted. But on this 
occasion we are less sure. We suggested above that the 
impact of the present crisis depends on the scale of the 
deflation of house and property prices in the domestic 
market, the scale of the impact on local financial service 
activities, and the spread to the wider domestic economy. 
On each of these the effect is likely to differ between 
Scotland and the UK. We look at each in turn. 
 
Housing and property market 
The root of the credit crunch lies in the bursting of the asset 
bubble in housing and property markets in the US, UK and 
now in several other countries. The ending of the house and 
property price boom would be expected to affect activity in 
house building and construction and with declining net asset 
values promote a slowdown in household spending. As 
Figure 6 indicates, the construction sector has been weak in 
Scotland for some time, with GVA falling from the 2006q3. 
The same has not applied to UK construction, which peaked 
in the first quarter of this year followed by a fall in GVA of 
0.5% in the 2008q2 compared to a fall of 0.4% in Scotland. 
Data from the latest Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey 
(SCBS) suggest that the sector continued to contract in the 
third quarter of this year with a large proportion of firms 
expecting lower sales, jobs and profits over the next twelve 
months. The percentage of firms reporting declining 
business confidence was the highest since the survey 
began. 
An examination of data on house prices should offer some 
indication of the likely comparative UK and Scottish impact 
of the ending of the house price boom. Figures 7 and 8 
chart the change in house prices since 1983. Figure 7 
reveals that UK house prices more than tripled from the 
previous trough in house prices in 1993 to the latest peak in 
2007 whereas Scottish house prices rose by just under 2.5 
times the 1993 figure. From Figure 8, it is clear that house 
prices are likely to have fallen by proportionally less in 
Scotland (-3.4%) than in the UK (-8.3%). The figure also 
shows that changes in Scottish house prices lag changes in 
the UK and that the degree of change in house prices here 
tends to be less. We judge from this that both the absolute 
and relative fall in house prices is likely to be less in 
Scotland than in the UK. For this reason, and given also that 
the Scottish home ownership rate at 66%, despite strong 
growth in the five years to 2006, continues to be lower than 
in the UK at 70%, we expect that the impact on the Scottish 
economy of the end of the house price boom will be less 
than in the UK. 
 
Financial services and banking  
We noted in the June 2008 Commentary that financial 
services (8% of economy GVA), for a long time a key driver 
of the Scottish economy, began to stutter in the post 
2005Q1 period with quarterly growth averaging 0.98% 
compared to 2.03% in the earlier period. The weakening 
performance of financial services was much influenced by 
the downturn in the second and third quarters of 2007 with 
GVA falling by 3.4% and 1.8% respectively – see Figure 9. 
What remained unclear was how much this weaker 
performance was related to the “credit crunch” and/or 
whether other factors contributed. In the final quarter of last 
year the sector grew appreciably by 3.8%. However, in the 
first quarter of 2008 the measured GVA of financial services 
fell dramatically by 9.1% and this was followed by a further 
fall of 1.0% in the second quarter. On the face of it this 
suggests that the ‘credit crunch’ was having a significant 
impact on Scottish financial services in the first half of the 
year. It is worth entering a note of caution here, though, 
because UK financial services grew by 2.7% in the first 
quarter of the year and was essentially stagnant exhibiting 
zero growth in the second quarter. To muddy the waters 
further, the Scottish Government’s GVA data on banking 
reveals that the sector grew by 3.6% in the second quarter, 
with the brunt of the contraction in financial services being 
born by the insurance sector, after contracting by more than 
11% in the first quarter. 
 
We conclude that the impact of the ‘credit crunch’ has been 
evident in the financial services sector data for Scotland and 
the effect will become even more clear in the next few 
quarters. But will the impact on financial services be bigger 
here than in the UK as a whole?  
 
We take the view that the impact will be bigger here and that 
there may be a lingering negative effect in the long-term. 
This is because the scale of the losses on sub-prime and 
impairments facing the two principal Scottish banks, RBS 
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and HBOS, are considerable and exceptional compared to 
other UK banks. The losses have pushed RBS and HBOS 
to the brink of bankruptcy. This outcome underlined the 
extent to which the lending behaviour of the two banks had 
ceased to be underpinned by the traditional risk 
management practices that had led Scottish 
banking/bankers to be perceived as prudent and even 
‘canny’.  
 
There is much evidence for this. The new CEO of RBS 
Stephen Hester, in interviews following his appointment, 
made it clear that the bank had lent far too much in good 
times and had fostered a ‘bull market culture’. The position 
at HBOS was even worse with the company seeking to 
become the ‘Tesco of UK banking’ii with an emphasis on 
sales growth and cost efficiency. The company firmly 
believed that such a strategy was not at the cost of 
additional risk, with Phil Hodkinson Group Finance Director, 
stressing that “(t)he combined ratio of cost and impairments 
to income has … fallen over time at HBOS … despite a 
period of worsening impairments in the UK unsecured 
market.”iii  With hindsight that statement must be viewed as 
over optimistic at the very least. Added to this it would 
appear that HBOS corporate lending was over focused on 
property and house building companies. So, it is being hit by 
a triple whammy of losses on collateral debt obligations 
(CDOs), based on sub-prime, and rising impairments on 
both the demand and supply sides of the housing and 
property markets. 
 
There will be a short to medium term impact of all of this on 
Scottish banking. Output and jobs will be cut back. The 
government sponsored takeover of HBOS by Lloyds/TSB is 
likely to lead to a rationalisation of the two banks high street, 
back office and HQ operations. But it would be a mistake to 
believe that the prospective job losses are the consequence 
of the takeover. Rather they are the consequence of the 
policies of HBOS management. In the absence of the 
Lloyds/TSB takeover it is almost certain that HBOS would 
have become insolvent and would have had to be directly 
nationalised. Job losses and output contraction would have 
been the inevitable outcome as the UK government sought 
to make it an attractive proposition for an eventual buyer. 
And it might be argued that since Lloyds/TSB has significant 
retail banking overlap with HBOS in Scotland, the potential 
for rationalisation and cost reductions is high and so 
Lloyds/TSB may be able to offer a higher bid price than 
other likely bidders 
 
Further to these direct effects, the two Scottish banks are 
also going to be affected by the rising impairments 
consequent upon a slow down in the wider economy and 
HBOS would appear to be especially exposed to this as we 
note above due its lending focus on property and house 
building businesses. Finally, the banks current unwillingness 
to lend plus a reduction in the demand for loans as the 
economy slows will also help to reduce banks’ income. The 
scale of this will depend on the extent of the slowdown in 
the wider economy, to which we turn in the next section. 
One further point. We should not underestimate the damage 
in the longer term this episode has done, and may yet do, to 
Scotland’s reputation for banking excellence. It seems 
unlikely that RBS will adopt such an aggressive lending and 
growth policy in the future but it might also find it harder to 
win new business when the upturn in the economy 
eventually occurs unless and until confidence in its 
management is fully restored. For an independent HBOS, 
the same problem would apply, and might be worse. But 
absorbed into Lloyds/TSB, which has managed to maintain 
its banking reputation, such problems will be much less. 
 
The wider economy 
The main mechanisms through which the present crisis is 
spreading outside the property and financial markets are 
through falls in: 
 
x intermediate demand impacts on suppliers to 
financial service companies, property developers, 
house builders and construction companies; 
 
x domestic household demand due to the impact of 
asset price deflation – e.g. houses and shares – on 
spending plans, plus the secondary multiplier 
effects of reduced spending by workers and 
shareholders in financial service and property 
related companies; 
 
x external household demand for Scottish goods and 
services – including tourism –  as the crisis 
spreads throughout the world economy lowering 
trade flows; 
x credit supply from banks to investing firms and 
households, as banks seek to rebuild their balance 
sheets via loan restriction and higher charges; 
 
x inward investment from non-Scottish companies 
abroad due to own product demand contraction 
and credit supply restriction; 
 
x confidence of business managers and households, 
a lowering in confidence is likely to reduce 
investment and spending plans independently of 
the direct and secondary demand and price effects 
of the property and financial crisis. 
 
We saw in Figure 4 that and the GVA in real estate & 
business services, hotels & catering, and food & drink had 
turned down during the second quarter of this year. Activity 
in real estate has been clearly affected by the slowdown in 
the property market. The slowdown in hotels and catering, 
and food and drink may reflect the effect of the crisis on 
export sales, with the demand for luxury products such as 
foreign holidays and whisky tending to be cut back early as 
the growth of household incomes worldwide slows. The 
manufacturing export figures for the second quarter support 
this view with foreign exports of food, drink and tobacco 
falling in real terms by 2.5%. It might also be expected that 
Scotland’s production of upmarket textiles products, and 
NOVEMBER 2008 PAGE 9 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
clothing would also be hit. Again the export figures for the 
second quarter appear to confirm this with a real fall in sales 
of 6.6%, but this did not affect the production data with GVA 
in the sector rising by 1.8% in the quarter. Overall, the level 
of Scottish manufactured exports was unchanged in 2008q2 
suggesting that the expected slowdown in world incomes 
and trade had only just begun to lap at our shores. 
The impact on domestic household incomes and demand of 
the crisis would be expected to effect retailing activity fairly 
quickly in the downturn. And this appears to have been 
occurring during the second quarter. For while retail & 
wholesale experienced an upturn in GVA (+1.7%) during the 
quarter, at the level of the retail sector alone GVA fell (-
1.8%), all be it against a background of an increase of over 
4% over the year to the second quarter. 
 
We have no official outturn data on production after the 
second quarter. However, survey data are available for the 
third quarter and these are reviewed in the Commentary 
below: A Review of Scottish Business Surveys. These 
surveys broadly confirm the fear that domestic demand, 
production and labour market performance and business 
confidence are deteriorating appreciably. While our Review 
warns that survey results such as these can easily lend 
themselves to an over pessimistic interpretation, and so 
must be treated with caution, there is strong evidence of a 
general slowdown in activity and rising spare capacity with 
inflationary pressures beginning to ease. 
 
 
Forecasts 
 
Forecasting is hedged around with considerable uncertainty 
at the best of times. The best times for forecasting are when 
the economy is exhibiting steady growth, sustained over 
long periods. The worst time, is probably a situation like the 
present where there is clear evidence of a shock to the 
system but insufficient evidence to gain a deep 
understanding of the strength and duration of the 
consequences for each of the transmission mechanisms 
noted above: direct demand; intermediate input demand; 
domestic household demand; external household demand; 
credit supply; inward investment; and confidence of 
businesses and consumers. Because of these heightened 
levels of uncertainty we are publishing a range of forecasts 
based on different scenarios. These are: 
 
x a central or base case; 
 
x an optimistic case; 
 
x a  recession and slow recovery case; 
 
x a sustained recession case 
 
We deal with our central forecast first and then summarise 
the alternative scenarios, with further detail provided in the 
Scottish Forecasts section of this Commentary. 
 
Central forecast 
This is our central case and in our judgement has the 
highest  - but unspecified -probability of occurring. In this 
case the growth of the principal components of aggregate 
demand slows down significantly in 2009 but begin to pick 
up again in 2010 returning to pre-crisis levels in 2011 or 
2012.  Falling asset prices, lowered confidence, the 
depression in the housing market, and contraction in the 
construction and financial service sectors lead to the growth 
of consumer/household demand falling by 0.6% next year. 
Lower business confidence, rapidly slowing aggregate 
demand and credit supply restrictions lead to investment 
demand becoming slightly negative in 2008 (-1.8%), and 
significantly negative in 2009 (-6%). Export growth slows but 
remains positive as weaker sterling offsets to a limited 
extent the slowdown in the growth of world demand and 
trade. 
 
In these circumstances, we are forecasting  - see Figure 10 
- that Scottish GDP growth will slow from 1.9% in 2007 to 
0.7% in 2008. Next year, 2009, we project that GDP will fall 
by -1.1%, but recession will only be evident in that year as 
growth picks up again to 0.7% in 2010, 1.2% in 2011 and 
1.5% in 2012. So this forecast suggests that we shall have 
from 2007, five years of below trend growth and a fall in 
output, or recession in 2009.  
 
Such a slowdown in GDP has implications for the labour 
market. For the first time in quite a few years Scotland 
experiences net job losses, with over 4,000 lost in 2008, 
more than 37,000 lost in 2009, and below 12,000 in 2010. In 
2011, net jobs begin to be created again quite quickly with 
more than 14, 000 net jobs, rising to net job creation of 
below 24,000 in 2012 – see Figure11. 
 
The scale of the job losses is sufficient to push up 
unemployment from the historically low levels that the 
Scottish economy has enjoyed over the past few years – 
see Figure 12. Unemployment on the ILO measure rises 
from 117,300, or 4.4%, in 2008 to 152,300, 5.7% in 2009, 
and peaks at 162,300, or 6.1% in 2010. The effect of the 
slowdown in GDP and jobs growth has a lagged effect on 
unemployment. By 2011, the unemployment rate has begun 
to fall to 151,000, or 5.7%, falling further to137,300, or 5.2% 
in 2012. 
 
Alternative scenarios 
Figures 10, 11 and 12 graph the expected outturn for GDP 
growth, net jobs change and the ILO unemployment rate 
over the forecast horizon under our alternative scenarios.  
 
On our optimistic scenario financial and housing market 
impacts are less severe, lending behaviour picks up more 
quickly, confidence is re-established sooner, and monetary 
policy is a little more aggressive. Here GDP growth slows 
down in 2008 but by less than in the central case falling to 
0.8%. Similarly, in 2009 the scale of the fall in GDP is 
slightly less at –1% rather than –1.1%. In 2010, 2011 and 
2012 there is a stronger recovery as growth rise to 1%, 
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1.6% and 1.8% respectively, returning almost to trend by 
2012. Job losses are also less in this case and the recovery 
in the labour market stronger, with net job change of -32,470 
in 2009, -4,992 in 20010, 23,669 in 2011 and 29,876 in 
2012. This has a more favourable impact on unemployment 
than in the central case. 
 
 
 
In the recession plus slow recovery case there is both a 
stronger downturn and slower recovery than in the central or 
base case. In this scenario, lowered confidence, depression 
in the housing market, contraction in the construction and 
financial service sectors are more severe than in the central 
case. Lending behaviour does not improve significantly from 
present levels, and monetary policy remains cautious after 
the recent rate cuts. GDP falls by – 1.2% in 2009 there are 
considerable job losses of over 46,000 and the ILO 
unemployment rate increases to 6.3%. Growth hardly 
recovers in 2010 as GDP expands by only 0.6%, nearly 
16,000 net jobs are lost and the unemployment rate 
increases further to 6.4%. However, by 2011 and 2012 GDP 
growth increases further to 1% and 1.2% but remains well 
below trend. Net jobs begin to be created in the final two 
years by 9,000 and 17,000 respectively and the 
unemployment rate recovers somewhat to 6.1% and 5.5%. 
 
Our final case is, in our view, a worst-case scenario of 
sustained recession. Here, the seizure of the financial 
system continues for an extended period, bank illiquidity 
persists, lending continues to be severely constrained, and 
business confidence remains low. This leads to a greater 
contraction in household and investment demand, with 
negative growth for two consecutive years of –1.6% in 2009 
and – 0.4% in 2010. Growth turns weakly positive at 0.3% in 
2011 and continues no better than this year’s expected 
growth rate of 0.7% in 2012. Under this scenario net job 
losses are considerable as the downturn is sufficient to 
produce a shakeout of hoarded labour. Net employment 
falls by 73,000 in 2009, and by 44,000 in 2010. Weak net 
job creation occurs in 2011 of just over 2,000 jobs and 8,000 
jobs in 2012. ILO unemployment deteriorates to 6.5% in 
2009, peaking at 7.1% or 187,000 in 2010. In 2011 and 
2012 there is some improvement as the rate falls to 6.2% 
and 5.8% but these rates remain well above present levels. 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
10 November 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
 
Endnotes: 
iMartin Wolf, Financial Times, 31 October 2008. 
iiFrom speech by HBOS Group Finance Director, Phil 
Hodkinson, Goldman Sachs Conference, 15 June 2007. 
iiiibid 
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Figure 1:  Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 1998q2 to 2008q2 
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Figure 2: Scottish and UK Services Quarterly GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2008q2 
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Figure 3:  Scottish and UK Manufacturing Quarterly GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2008q2 
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Figure 4:  Growth of key sectors in Scotland 2002q1 to 2008q2 
 
80.0
85.0
90.0
95.0
100.0
105.0
110.0
115.0
120.0
125.0
130.0
20
02
q1
20
02
q2
20
02
q3
20
02
q4
20
03
q1
20
03
q2
20
03
q3
20
03
q4
20
04
q1
20
04
q2
20
04
q3
20
04
q4
20
05
q1
20
05
q2
20
05
q3
20
05
q4
20
06
q1
20
06
q2
20
06
q3
20
06
q4
20
07
q1
20
07
q2
20
07
q3
20
07
q4
20
08
q1
20
08
q2
Public Sector (230)
Hotels and Catering (35)
Transport & Communication (74)
Real Est. & Business Services (193)
Retail & Wholesale (112)
Other Services (58)
Electronics (21)
Financial Services (83)
Chemicals (14)
Food & Drink (32)
 
NOVEMBER 2008 PAGE 13 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Figure 5:  GVA Growth Recessions in the UK and Scotland 1963 to 2007 
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Figure 6:  Scottish and UK Construction GVA Volume Growth 1998q2 - 2008q2 
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Figure 7:  Annual Average House Prices in Scotland and UK, 1983 to 2008, 1983 = 100 
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Figure 8:  Change in Average House Prices in Scotland and UK, 1983 to 2008, 1983 = 100 
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Figure 9:  Scottish and UK Financial Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2008q2 
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Figure 10:  Forecast Scottish GVA Growth 2008 to 2012 - Different Scenarios 
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Figure 11:  Forecast Net Jobs Change, 2008 to 2012 - Different Scenarios 
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Figure 12:  ILO Unemployment Rate Forecast, 2008-2012 - Different Scenarios 
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Background 
 
For four years through to mid 2007 the ‘global economy 
boomed’ (International Monetary Fund, October 2008), with 
world growth averaging some 5% per annum, the strongest 
sustained rate for some three decades. Growth in 
developing and emerging economies was pronounced with 
China, India and Brazil reporting amongst the strongest 
annual growth rates. At the same time inflation remained 
modest and an image of macroeconomic stability prevailed 
in both political and financial circles. In the UK policies of 
targeting inflation levels have been evident since 1997 and 
a policy of low and stable inflation was evident in the US 
where Alan Greenspan led the US Federal Reserve. 
 
The general picture was one of relatively strong economic 
growth; low and stable inflation, matched by low interest 
rates. Unemployment was falling; investment was rising as 
were incomes and profits while home ownership was 
increasing. Fiscal rules were established in the UK so that 
borrowing would be prudent and only for investment (see 
the Golden Rule and the Sustainable Investment Rule). 
Soon global financial innovation led to strong growth in that 
sector (at the sector’s peak it represented 25 per cent of all 
firms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index whereas at the 
time of writing it is in the low teens) but across the 
developed world the authorities favoured light touch 
regulation. 
 
In these apparently benign conditions countries 
experienced economic prosperity and were able to pursue 
a range of social and domestic agendas. House prices, 
financial stocks and assets, commodity prices, tax 
revenues, profits, wages etc. all grew at a reasonable rate. 
 
Despite some mild warnings on rising oil prices, the 
increasing need for financial regulation, rising global 
financial imbalances, the concerns as to the durability of 
low interest rates in the long term, as well as rapidly rising 
house and stock prices; governments, investors and 
consumers continued to take comfort on the perceptions of 
macroeconomic stability, continued global low real interest 
rates and sustainable growth.  
 
In these global conditions household and corporate 
borrowing rose rapidly from 1998 onwards in the United 
Kingdom. As the Bank of England noted ‘over time, banks 
took on progressively more credit risk by lending to, for 
PAGE 18 VOLUME 32  NUMBER 2 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
example, households with high loan to income ratios, 
leveraged buy out firms and, in the United States, to the 
sub prime market’ (Bank of England, Financial Stability 
Report. October 2008).  
 
Additionally, more complex financial products using 
leverage to improve returns emerged in the climate of 
rising financial liquidity, and as the Bank of England noted, 
in a context of ‘lower discrimination between instruments of 
differing financial quality’ (Bank of England, Financial 
Stability Report. October 2008). The internationalisation of 
finance and rising current account surpluses in oil 
producing and some Asian countries enabled UK banks to 
dramatically expand their lending. In 2001 UK customer 
lending was comparable to customer deposits, but 2008 
the surplus of lending over deposits was £700 billion, and 
real leveraged buyout loan issuance rose from  under $100 
billion in 2004 to over $500 billion in 2007 (Bank of England 
Stability Report October 2008). 
 
The vulnerabilities of these developments became 
increasingly evident as oil prices rose rapidly (peaking at 
$147 in June 2008) driving up energy and food prices and 
increasing numbers defaulted on sub prime mortgages. As 
these concerns and the underlying structural problems in 
the international financial system became apparent there 
was a sharp increase in financial instability and the ‘credit 
crunch’, ‘toxic assets’ and re-capitalising the financial 
sector emerged as a popular terms.  
 
 
Scottish Forecasts – some scenarios 
 
 
Introduction 
The last time the FAI forecast was conducted on a scenario 
basis was in March 2003 to explore the possible outcome 
and impacts of the war in Iraq on the UK and Scotland. 
Due to the gravity of the current economic crisis it would be 
difficult to have a single point forecast due to the multiple 
competing factors that may influence the course of the 
world, UK and Scottish economies at this time. For these 
reasons the forecast has been conducted using four 
scenarios which have different underlying assumptions. 
The scenarios, with probabilities, are termed: 
 
 
x Optimistic scenario (15 per cent probability); 
x Central, our base scenario (40 per cent 
probability); 
x Recession plus slow recovery, a worse scenario 
(35 per cent probability) and  
x Sustained recession, a really poor scenario (10 
per cent probability). 
 
 
Each scenario is described in the text while the 
assumptions are fully documented in Appendix 1. The 
focus remains on GVA growth, employment and net job 
changes as well as unemployment.  
 
Assumptions for final demand 
The central case was used to define the most likely factors 
to be of importance going forward at this time. Thereafter 
for each scenario the different outcomes were considered 
and an interpretation given as to how that would fit with a 
particular scenario. The critical issues were deemed to be: 
 
x Interest rates and monetary policy; 
x Inflationary expectations; 
x Re-capitalisation of banks and financial 
institutions; 
x Lending behaviour; 
x The impact of the finance sector on the real 
economy; 
x The labour market; 
x House prices; 
x Government debt, imbalances and fiscal policy 
and  
x Exports. 
 
As usual the drivers of the FAI model are: 
 
x Consumption (C); 
x Government spending (G); 
x Investment (I); 
x Stocks (S); 
x Tourism (T) ; 
x Exports to the Rest of the UK (XRUK) and  
x Exports to the Rest of the World (XROW). 
 
In general terms our expectation is that consumption will 
contract in 2009 (-0.6 per cent) and only return to near 
trend by 2011-12. It is clear from UK data, from the 
relationship between Scottish and UK consumption and 
from retail sales data etc. that consumption in Scotland is 
falling.  
 
Government spending is vital in 2009 to help support the 
economy. Particularly relevant of course is the Government 
intervention in banks and Bank of England schemes to help 
support the economy (although this is factored into the 
assumptions government spending growth rates are taken 
as that identifiable expenditure seen in Scotland). The UK 
and Scottish governments, would in the normal course of 
events, act in a counter cyclical fashion, thus even as signs 
of recovery are appearing then government spending 
would start to decline. This is a significant change in the 
scenarios because compared to the Central scenario there 
are times when government spending does not decline 
depending on the assumed economic conditions of the 
scenario and on timing.  
 
Investment is the driver that is hit hardest by the current 
economic climate as most businesses have completely 
abandoned investment plans faced with spiralling costs 
and the difficulties of securing borrowing at affordable 
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rates. Investment is expected to shrink by 6 per cent in 
2009 and by a further 0.4 per cent in 2010. By 2012 it is 
only assumed to grow by 2.4 per cent in the Central 
scenario. 
 
Stocks and tourism are relatively muted with stocks 
building up just as the turning point of the crisis emerged 
and tourism has been very poor since 2005 and estimates 
indicate it may be 2011 before any significant growth is 
seen. 
 
Exports comprise of two components (XRUK and XROW). 
XRUK are expected to be poor in 2008 and 2009 but to 
pick up slightly in 2010. Export performance to the Euro 
Area and the US is expected to be at its lowest in 2009 
(looking forward only) and to grow by 7.1 per cent in 2011. 
Even the sterling depreciation which should boost exports 
is more than offset by the decline in demand in the US, the 
Euro Area and other export markets. 
 
Clearly all the evidence points to 2009 being a very poor 
year and the expectation is that economic growth will be 
low; trading conditions will be difficult and the labour 
market is definitely weakening. Co-ordinated fiscal and 
monetary policy will be crucial issues across the globe. At 
the beginning of each scenario there will be a brief 
explanation about how the drivers of final demand differ 
from the Central scenario. The Central scenario will be 
outlined in detail first. 
 
 
Four scenarios of possible outcomes 
 
The Central scenario in detail 
The main scenario is one where interest rates are cut to 
about 3 per cent in 2009 (this scenario was started before 
the Bank of England cut rates by 150 basis points!) and 
inflation is relatively muted. 2009 is the year where most of 
the pain takes place with a sharp contraction in the finance 
and service sector affecting the rest of the economy. 
Lending eases after some12 months and the 
recapitalisation plan works well although companies 
(especially small and medium sized firms) find rescheduling 
debt etc. difficult. The Government’s debt rises quickly but 
compared to other developed nations the debt to GDP ratio 
remains favourable. House prices contract sharply and 
continue falling and there is a period of 3-5 years where 
prices are stagnant. The labour market weakens and 
exports fall. 
 
GVA and broad sectoral output 
GVA growth is forecast to be 0.7 per cent in 2008 and -1.1 
per cent in 2009. Growth in 2011 rises to 1.2 per cent and 
to 1.5 per cent in 2012. This is presented in Figure 1 and is 
compared to GVA growth in the other scenarios. This 
scenario is estimated to be the most probable outcome for 
the Scottish economy with a 40 per cent probability. 
Monetary policy, inflationary pressures and the government 
recovery plan push the probable outcome to between this 
scenario and the optimistic scenario. However, the fall in 
house prices, lending behaviour and labour market 
weakness pull the probable outcome down toward the 
recession scenario.  
 
Figure 1 presents the probable path of the growth of GVA 
under the four scenarios and the Central scenario growth is 
for a relatively quick return to positive growth following this 
global shock. There have only been four years since 1964 
when GDP growth was negative: 1974 (-0.04 per cent); 
1975 (-1.47 per cent); 1980 (-1.93 per cent) and 1981 (-
1.38 per cent) and in the years 1986 and 1991 GDP was 
less than 0.5 per cent. Otherwise the Scottish economy 
has enjoyed 40 years of economic growth which was 
strongest in 1964 at 7.57 per cent (Scottish Government 
GVA Index, 2004 prices). 
 
The service sector usually drives growth in the Scottish 
economy but due to the nature of the downturn the service 
sector is likely to bear the brunt of the recession along with 
construction. Manufacturing and agriculture, while still 
affected although by a lesser degree. Services are forecast 
to contract by 1.3 per cent after growth of 1.3 per cent in 
2008. It is likely to be 2012 before growth of 1.6 per cent is 
seen again. It may be 2015 before growth of 2 per cent is 
experienced. 
 
Manufacturing has had a difficult time over 2005-06 and in 
2008. The sector is forecast to contract by 0.1 per cent in 
2009 but to grow again by 0.5 per cent in 2010. Growth is 
forecast to be 1 per cent by 2012. Manufacturing is actually 
quite strong and resilient despite very difficult trading and 
lending conditions as firms have become accustomed to 
this. The sector has been shedding jobs continuously since 
1998 but productivity remains good as the sector has had 
positive growth in 7 of the last 11 years. The main problem 
(ignoring cash-flow) for growth in this sector is the collapse 
of investment. Investment in plant & machinery, new 
technology, training, and productivity is key to the health of 
the sector. As yet it is unclear how the sector is faring but 
business survey evidence indicates that manufacturing is in 
for a difficult time and actual growth may be lower than the 
forecasts presented here. 
 
Construction grew at a very strong pace in the period 2003-
06 but has declined by 2 per cent in 2007 and is forecast to 
contract by 2.1 per cent in 2008. Growth could shrink by a 
further 2.4 per cent in 2009 and the sector is not forecast to 
recover to stronger growth until 2012 although modest 
positive growth is forecast for 2010 
 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing is forecast to grow by 0.3 
per cent in 2008 but to decline marginally in 2009. The 
sector is forecast to recover gradually through 2010 to 
2012. Figure 2 presents growth for 2008-12 for the main 
sectors of the Scottish economy.
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Figure 1:  Comparison of GVA growth under the four scenarios, 2008-2012 
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Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde. 
Note: The Central scenario shows two thin lines either side of it outlining the probable spread of forecasts. As time increases this dispersion 
becomes wider. This scenario is plotted in its mid range. 
The optimistic scenario is plotted at the bottom of its range and the error bar shows the probable upward range (no line shown as this is quite 
small). 
The sustained recession scenario is plotted at the top of its range and all the risks are to the downside with this scenario. It is shown with a 
probable boundary of outcomes by the slightly darker thin line at the very bottom of the chart. This demonstrates that GVA growth could contract 
at best by 1.56 per cent or at its worst by 2.06 per cent in 2009. 
The recession case scenario has no probable outcome shown for the sake of clarity as it is similar to the central scenario probability. 
 
 
The Optimistic scenario 
The next scenario considers a more optimistic outlook for 
the economy. Essentially most factors here are optimal e.g. 
policy, timing, lending behaviour, recapitalisation and in this 
scenario expectations are exceeded slightly. This scenario 
has the current Bank of England’s monetary response with 
a deeper and earlier than expected cut in interest rates. It 
may be that a further 50 basis point cut, say in February, 
would firmly push this scenario more into the middle 
ground. The downside factors to this scenario are the 
apparent reluctance of financial institutions to deal more 
sympathetically with borrowers with difficulties; the 
weakening labour market especially the sharp shedding of 
labour and the problems in the housing market. This 
scenario has one additional assumption and that is that the 
homecoming is particularly successful and tourism, retail, 
transport etc. all benefit from this. The other scenarios 
assume that 2009 is a credit crunch year in external 
economies as well, and despite the weak pound travellers 
do not respond as anticipated due to falling disposable 
income and that they face rising costs. 
 
GVA growth in this scenario is forecast to be -1 per cent in 
2009 and 1 per cent in 2010. The economy recovers to 1.6 
per cent in 2010 and 1.8 per cent in 2012. This is a quick 
but not a painless transition from the recession of 2009. 
Nevertheless, all the main sectors still contract in 2009 
under these assumptions. 
 
Services shrink by 1.2 per cent in 2009 but grow by 1 per 
cent in 2010. By 2012 growth in the service sector is close 
to 2 per cent. Manufacturing performs well with a small 
decline in 2009 but relatively strong growth in 2010 through 
to 2012. Investment is expected to pick up in 2011 by 2 per 
cent and export performance is also estimated to be 
relatively strong from 2010 onwards. While construction is 
forecast to decline by 2.4 per cent in 2009, it recovers well
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Figure 2:  Comparison of GVA and sectoral growth:  Central scenario, 2008-2012 
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Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
Recession plus slow recovery, a scenario 
where economic conditions are worse than 
expected  
This scenario envisages a situation where the Bank of 
England takes a more cautious and stepwise approach to 
interest rate cutting while inflationary pressures begin to 
build due to fundamentals of oil supply and demand and 
OPEC action. While recapitalisation works there are some 
initial problems but crucially lending behaviour does not 
ease for some time, perhaps 12-18 months. The 
expectation is that the Bank of England base rate and the 
interbank lending rate do not converge quickly. These 
factors mean that the impact of the crisis across the real 
economy is more acute and particularly small and medium-
sized businesses suffer. House prices remain flat for about 
5 years as labour market support weakens considerably 
and unemployment increases more quickly than expected. 
Exporting firms also face considerable hardship under this 
scenario. 
 
Growth of GVA in this case is -1.2 per cent for 2009 and 
recovery is slow with 0.6 per cent in 2010 and just over 1 
per cent in 2012. The service sector declines by 1.4 per 
cent in 2009 and only grows by 0.6 per cent in 2010. By 
2012 growth in services is 1.9 per cent. Manufacturing 
contracts slightly in 2009, has some small positive growth 
in 2010 but declines again in 2011 and in 2012. This is in 
part due to very tough trading conditions, slow investment 
but primarily because firms find it difficult or expensive to 
secure funding and capital. Companies in the export 
market are also more exposed and more likely to contract 
than grow. This is seen across the forecast horizon. Figure 
3 depicts the forecast for the main sectors in this scenario. 
The plight of manufacturing can clearly be seen as is the 
obvious reverse in construction. Construction performs 
poorly in 2011 as this scenario does not have adequate 
lending, poor labour market opportunities and falling 
incomes so consumers are not yet ready to step onto the 
housing market in significant numbers. Furthermore there 
are significant bottlenecks as public investment projects go 
ahead (these will have had long lead times) and the 
situation is not resolved until late 2011 or 2012. Figure 3 
also demonstrates the recovery of the service sector and 
how GVA follows it closely. The last scenario is the 
sustained recession outcome. 
 
 
The Sustained recession scenario, the worst 
case scenario for the economy 
The previous scenarios were relatively similar but did have 
different assumptions and these led to slightly different 
growth paths. The last scenario; the sustained recession 
outcome is not included to have something different but 
because all four scenarios are actual probable outcomes.  
This however, while having the smallest probability (10 per 
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Figure 3:  Comparison of GVA and sectoral growth: Recession scenario, 2008-2012 
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Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde. 
 
businesses and consumers wish to avoid. This will depend 
upon co-ordinated global monetary and fiscal policy 
appropriate to country circumstances as well as a domestic 
agenda that will deliver a recovery that does not simply 
exacerbate the current situation (as in Japan in the 1990s). 
 
This scenario is real in that further undisclosed losses in 
the banking system are declared at different times (in the 
US, UK and Europe). The recapitalisation plan and the 
scheme on offer from central banks does not cope or is not 
used appropriately by financial institutions. More capital is 
required for the world financial system. Lending behaviour 
is poor and private capital is either slow to respond or is not 
offered. Thus re-capitalisation takes about 24-36 months 
before the system is functioning properly again and private 
capital is attracted back to institutions. Fiscal packages do 
not give the response required either and banks are 
unresponsive to business needs. This causes significant 
hardship in the business community with several large 
firms in trouble leading to further falls in business and 
consumer confidence. Cash-flow becomes absolutely 
critical and job losses are probably severe. The housing 
market undergoes a prolonged contraction while other 
asset prices continue to fall. Uncertainty prevails as 
disposable income drops sharply and wealth shrinks. The 
government debt and imbalances grow although they 
remain favourable compared to other countries. It may 
even be that the situation causes the government to fall but 
replacing the government in this way may actually make 
the situation worse due to catch-up, experience etc. 
However fear and psychological factors become more 
important. Exports continue to fall but the weakening pound 
does set the scene for an export led recovery. The 
Monetary Policy Committee  faces a real dilemma as 
growth falters but inflationary pressure picks up 
significantly with oil prices rising to more than $100 per 
barrel due to supply and demand imbalances and OPEC 
action. In Scotland the finance sector may shed between 
20-30,000 jobs alone. 
 
In this scenario growth is forecast to be -1.6 per cent in 
2009 and is also negative in 2010 (-0.4 per cent). Even by 
2012 growth has not recovered to more than 1 per cent. 
Manufacturing is forecast to stall in 2009 and contracts 
every year thereafter up to 2012 due to the severe 
economic conditions. Construction is also negative for the 
period 2008-11 with growth of 0.9 in 2012. 
 
The service sector decline in both 2009 and 2010 and 
forecast growth is only modest in 2011. The finance
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Figure 4:  Comparison of GVA and sectoral growth: Sustained recession scenario, 2008-2012 
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Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde 
 
  
sector contracts sharply in 2008 and 2009. There is no 
return to strong growth in the forecast period under this 
scenario. The most important point, if this set of 
circumstances emerged, is that the economy can only 
recover slowly and it may take 4-6 years before steady 
growth is seen again. 
This outcome highlights the vital importance of getting 
policy right and that consumers, businesses, financial 
institutions as well as government must act responsibly if 
the economy is to avoid a situation like this. Fortunately the 
probability of such an outcome is very low at 10 per cent 
but it still remains a very real possibility and has severe 
consequences for all concerned. There are several issues 
that come to light out of this: 
 
x Tax cuts – these should be designed so that real 
benefits can be realised from cutting taxes. Simply 
hoarding the money or carrying on irresponsible 
spending by assuming this is a permanent change 
or increasing credit levels further will only bring 
more hardship in the future. Tax breaks for new 
jobs, retraining or other schemes that help the 
economy would be particularly useful as is the 
postponement of new taxes. Simplification of the 
tax system would also be welcome; 
x Monetary policy – it is crucial that the Bank of 
England (as they have done) remain in control of 
the situation rather than being dictated to by 
economic conditions. They need to get in front of 
the curve, inter-bank lending rates have to 
converge while long run interest rates need to 
stop systemic bubbles as low long-term interest 
rates encourage low fixed rates on mortgages 
fuelling housing bubbles; 
x Lending behaviour must respond to the needs of 
the real economy particularly the business sector. 
Failure to do this will simply drive more firms to 
insolvency (insolvencies have increased by 25 per 
cent in England & Wales). Rescheduling 
mortgage debt is also a priority especially if 
household income changes; 
x The linkages in the economy are relatively fragile 
and once the credit crunch affects one part it will 
transfer to other parts due to supplier linkages and 
sub-contracting etc. Trying to preserve skills, 
retain labour and maintain orders will be difficult 
under these conditions and 
x The labour market has been buoyant for several 
years with the Scottish employment rate 
outperforming the UK employment rate. The 
indications from economic data, surveys and the 
forecast demonstrate that jobs are not safe under 
considerable adverse economic pressure. Job 
losses are relatively widespread and can be 
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Figure 5:  Forecasts of net job change: scenario comparison, 2008-2012 
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Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde. 
 
 
particularly deep in the scenarios that are more 
problematic. 
 
 
Employment forecasts  
Each of the forecasts returned different employment 
outcomes. These are discussed here. The forecasts of net 
job changes under the four scenarios are presented in 
Table 1 and Figure 5.  
 
The net job loss for the Central scenario for 2008 was 
4,230 and 37,244 in 2009. Over 2007-12 15,300 jobs are 
lost in total. Clearly 2009 is the year of peak job loss. The 
strength of recovery in the years 2011 and 2012 also has 
marked differences. Over 2007-10 (when jobs are being 
shed in all scenarios) the job loss is 41,700 in the 
Optimistic case; 53,100 in the Central scenario; 66,400 in 
the Recession scenario and finally 110,000 in the final 
scenario. Similarly the only scenario which gives a positive 
net job change over the period 2007-12 is the Optimistic 
scenario where 11,900 jobs are created. 
 
In the Central scenario the service sector supplies 27,900 
jobs in 2011-12 compared to 40,400 in the Optimistic case 
and 23,500 in the Recession scenario while the Sustained 
recession scenario see 19,900 jobs created over 2011-12. 
Services gain 14,740 jobs over 2008-12 in the Optimistic 
scenario but lose 8,757 in the Central scenario; 22,422 in 
the Recession scenario and 71,089 in the Sustained 
recession scenario over the same period of time. Within 
services the forecast for the finance sector differs 
considerably according to the assumptions used. In both 
the Central scenario and the Optimistic case 10,000 jobs 
are lost whereas in the Recession scenario 14,900 jobs are 
shed and in the Sustained recession scenario 24,000 jobs 
are lost in 2009. 
 
Manufacturing loses 1,500 jobs in 2009 and a small 
amount in 2010 but adds 500 jobs in 20111 and 2012 in 
the Central scenario. In the Optimistic scenario 
manufacturing loses the same amount of jobs as in the 
Central case in 2009 but thereafter job gains are slight 
greater being close to 1,000 jobs per year in 2011 and 
2012. In the Recession scenario manufacturing sheds 
3,500 jobs in 2008; 1,600 jobs in 2009 and a further 1,500 
in 2011. In the last scenario this sector sheds a 
considerable amount jobs every year and in totals this 
amounts to 16,836 over 2008-12. 
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Table 1 Net Job Change Forecasts: Scenario comparison, 2008-2012 
 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007-10 2007-12 
        
Optimistic -4,230 -32,470 -4,992 23,669 29,876 -41,692 11,853 
Central -4,230 -37,244 -11,638 14,222 23,605 -53,112 -15,285 
Recession -4,230 -46,498 -15,662 9.081 17,318 -66,389 -39,991 
Sustained recession -4,230 -72,639 -43,776 2,236 8,371 -120,644 -110,038 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Unemployment Forecasts: Scenario comparison, 2008-2012 
 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ILO      
Optimistic 4.4% 5.6% 5.9% 5.4% 5.0% 
Central 4.4% 5.7% 6.1% 5.7% 5.2% 
Recession 4.4% 6.1% 6.2% 5.8% 5.3% 
Sustained recession  4.4% 6.5% 7.1% 6.2% 5.8% 
      
CC      
Optimistic 2.8% 3.3% 3.3% 3.1% 2.9% 
Central 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 3.3% 3.1% 
Recession 2.8% 3.6% 3.7% 3.3% 3.2% 
Sustained recession  2.8% 4.0% 4.3% 3.6% 3.4% 
 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
 
Unemployment forecasts 
It has been some time since unemployment was relatively 
high in Scotland and even when electronics collapsed in 
2001-02, the service sector took on a lot of workers and the 
rise in unemployment was relatively muted. There are clear 
signs of rising unemployment in the economy and of fewer 
vacancies while business surveys indicate employers’ 
intentions on recruitment are currently negative. The 
forecasts of unemployment for ILO unemployment and the 
claimant count measure are presented below.  
 
Unemployment on the claimant count measure is relatively 
benign in the Optimistic scenario although ILO 
unemployment peaks in 2010 at 5.9 per cent. 2010 tends 
to be the year that ILO unemployment peaks in for all of the 
other three scenarios as well. Unemployment at 7.1 per 
cent is particularly high in the Recession plus scenario. The 
significant difference between 6.2 per cent (Recession) and 
the 7.1 per cent (Sustained recession) is something that 
policymakers need to heed. 
 
Claimant count unemployment is relatively muted in the 
Optimistic scenario and likewise does not pose too much of 
a problem in the Central scenario. In the Recession 
scenario and in the Sustained recession case it is more 
noticeable and may be a particular problem in the 
Sustained recession scenario if this actually came about. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The forecasts assumed four different outcomes for 9 
factors which combined to give the forecasts as described 
above. The Optimistic scenario is where most factors are 
dealt with in an optimal way leading to the least disruption 
to the economy. The Central scenario (40 per cent 
probability and the outcome most likely to happen) 
indicates that 2009 is a problem year for output and that 
2010 is the year in which unemployment peaks. Net job 
change is negative in 2008 and 2009 but recovers 
thereafter. The Recession scenario is one where economic 
conditions are worse than expected and some particular 
problems occur but overall there is a general worsening of 
conditions making it more difficult across the economy. 
PAGE 26 VOLUME 32  NUMBER 2 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Small and medium-sized businesses are expected to find 
this scenario tough with hiring, lending, cash-flow, job 
losses and exporting being problematic areas. In the last 
scenario, the sustained recession scenario, the main 
problem is that recapitalisation did not work as effectively 
as hoped while lending behaviour is poor and even large 
firms struggle. Inflationary pressures also return in this 
scenario giving it more problems. The outcome is that there 
is a sharp contraction in activity in 2009 and a very slow 
recovery that does not follow the paths of the other three 
scenarios. While it only has a 10 per cent probability it still 
remains a distinct possibility. All the risks in this scenario 
are on the downside. Policymakers need to guard against 
complacency and to watch that none of these factors come 
into play.  
 
 
Kenneth Low 
11 November 2008 
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Appendix 1 
The assumptions for the four scenarios considered are 
presented here in the appendix. 
 
Central scenario: 
x Interest rates are cut in a cautious but responsive 
approach to around 3 per cent by 2009. The 
November cut is deeper than the others although 
a similar cut may be implemented in January or 
February. By mid 2009 the Bank of England will 
have reduced interest rate to about 3-3.25 per 
cent; 
x Inflationary expectations are relatively muted as 
oil settles to approximately $90 per barrel; 
x The banks take up the government re-
capitalisation scheme as well as taking advantage 
of the Bank of England schemes. The period of 
re-capitalisation is expected to last for about 18-
24 months. Private capital is also raised; 
x Lending behaviour initially does not change 
significantly in the short run and despite interest 
rate cuts, interbank lending rates (Libor) do not 
converge on the base rate (set by the Bank of 
England) as quickly as the Government and the 
Bank of England would like. Lending eases 
somewhat however after about 12 months and 
definitely much more within 18 months; 
x The impact of the financial sector crisis is felt 
across the real economy as investment rapidly 
shrinks and lending constraints hit small and 
medium-sized businesses particularly hard. Cash-
flow for these firms becomes a critical issue in the 
struggle for survival. Only after prolonged lobbying 
and negotiation with government do financial 
institutions respond to the need for an 
improvement in helping companies with 
rescheduling debt, future funding and finance 
packages. Within the finance sector itself about 
10,000 jobs are lost; 
x Many firms experience financial hardship and lay 
off workers from the end of 2008 and throughout 
2009. Unemployment rises considerably in 2009. 
Household disposable income tightens sharply 
and labour market opportunities become fewer; 
x In the housing market prices continue to fall 
through 2009 and into 2010. House prices remain 
flat for about 3-5 years before growth is seen 
again; 
x Government debt and imbalances widen as debt 
rises sharply in 2009. The planned economic 
recovery works relatively well however and 
government debt is favourable when compared to 
some other developed nations (as a percentage of 
GDP) and 
x Exports fall as domestic demand in the US and 
Euro Area contract quickly and substantially. 
Imports to the UK fall by a greater amount 
therefore there is a net gain. Although sterling 
depreciates the stimulus this gives to boosting 
exports is completely offset by the reduction in 
demand elsewhere. 
 
Optimistic scenario: 
x Interest rates are cut more sharply to 3 per cent 
by early to mid 2009 using an initial cut of 1 per 
cent in November. Subsequent cuts are smaller 
but may be of a further 50 basis points in 
December/January/February. By the middle, and 
certainly by the end of 2009, the Bank of England 
will have reduced the base rate to 2.5-3 per cent; 
x Inflationary expectations remain low as oil prices 
are close to $80 per barrel throughout 2009. 
There is no evidence of previous higher prices 
feeding into wage claims; 
x The banks eagerly take up the government re-
capitalisation scheme as well as the Bank of 
England initiatives. The period of re-capitalisation 
is boosted by external private capital as well as a 
greater response by institutional investors. Banks 
with expected future prospects that are better than 
others benefit more and can redeem some 
preferences shares and re-negotiate dividends 
conditions. Share prices begin to rise more 
steadily by the end of 2009 as new management 
teams tackle the problems in the sector in an 
effective and efficient manner. A better 
performance is seen within 12 months although 
full recapitalisation still takes 12-18 months; 
x Lending behaviour the very short-term remains 
constrained but by early 2009 business terms are 
beginning to ease, thus helping firms with 
significant cash-flow and funding issues. Interbank 
lending rates do not converge on the base rate as 
quickly as perhaps desired but there is a clear 
downward movement towards it. Lending eases 
significantly after about 12 months; 
x The short-run impact of the financial sector 
remains sharp across the real economy and 
investment contracts quickly. Small and medium 
sized businesses do not experience any benefit 
until at least mid 2009. Cash-flow remains a key 
issue. The finance sector, independently and 
relatively quickly develop strategies to help 
businesses reschedule debt etc. Within the 
finance sector itself about 5-7,000 jobs are lost; 
x Companies still experience financial hardship and 
lay off workers from the end of 2008 and 
throughout 2009. Unemployment rises 
significantly in 2009. Household disposable 
income tightens sharply and labour market 
opportunities become fewer, but there is an 
easing in the labour market towards the end of 
2009 as the rate of job loss slows thus easing the 
pressure on unemployment; 
x House prices fall through 2009 and into 2010. 
House prices remain flat for approximately 3 years 
rising again, although at a modest pace initially; 
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x Government debt and imbalances widen as debt 
rises sharply in 2009. Depending on whether or 
not the banking and the financial sector needs 
more debt which may be taken on by the 
government or the Bank of England as they help 
institutions through the crisis. It is not envisaged 
that this would be anything like the recent 
recovery plan just modest additional resources to 
smooth the current functioning of the current plan. 
The planned economic recovery works better than 
expected and government debt is still favourable 
when compared to some other developed nations 
(as a percentage of GDP). Financial institutions 
are in a much healthier and stronger position by 
the end of 2009 and certainly by mid 2010 and 
x As in the previous scenario exports fall as 
domestic demand in the US and Euro Area 
contract quickly and substantially. Imports to the 
UK also fall by a greater amount giving a net gain. 
The sterling depreciation stimulates exports 
slightly more than expected but this is still 
completely offset by the reduction in demand. 
 
Recession scenario: 
x Interest rates are cut in a cautious approach to 
around 3.5 per cent by 2009. There is not a deep 
policy induced cut in November or February 
(although a cut of 50 basis points may take place 
in November). By mid 2009 the Bank of England 
will have reduced interest rate to about 3.5 per 
cent with the possibility of a further cut to 3.25 per 
cent; 
x There is significant concern over inflationary 
pressures as OPEC push the price of oil towards 
$100 per barrel. Demand for oil remains high in 
China, India and the emerging economies while 
geopolitical factors hinder supply slightly; 
x The banks and the government re-capitalisation 
scheme goes ahead with minor difficulties arising 
around the conditions of the offer. The Bank of 
England scheme is taken up without any 
problems. Private capital is slightly discouraged by 
future economic prospects and recapitalisation 
takes longer than expected, perhaps as long as 
18 months or slightly more. Private equity returns 
to the banks after this period and share prices 
begin to rise significantly again; 
x Lending behaviour does not change significantly 
and businesses are not given the chance to re-
schedule debt or to obtain additional funding from 
the UK finance sector in either the first quarter or 
first half of 2009. The gap between the Bank of 
England base rate and the Libor rate for bank 
inter-lending does not improve significantly with 
rates at around 1 percentage point above the 
base rate. Lending only improves after about 12-
18 months; 
x The impact of the financial sector crisis across the 
real economy is slightly more painful with sharp 
contractions in investment, consumption, lending 
and hiring which initially affects mostly small and 
medium-sized businesses, however now large 
firms are feeling a significant impact from this. 
Cash-flow becomes tighter and more firms fail. It 
takes longer for the financial sector to respond to 
the needs of business. Within the finance sector 
itself about 15,000 jobs are lost; 
x Most firms experience financial hardship and lay 
off a considerable number of workers in 2009. 
Unemployment increases by more than expected 
in 2009. Household incomes drop and  the labour 
market weakens considerably making conditions 
tougher throughout 2009 and into the early part of 
2010; 
x House prices fall more than expected in 2009 and 
weaken again in 2010. After this house prices 
remain flat for about 5 years before growth is seen 
again; 
x Government debt and imbalances widen as debt 
increases but it only increases relatively slowly 
following the initial recovery plan. The planned 
economic recovery is slower than expected as 
confidence falls further. Government debt remains 
favourable when compared to some other 
developed nations (as a percentage of GDP) and 
x Exports continue to fall as domestic demand in 
the US and Euro Area contract quickly and 
substantially. Imports to the UK fall by a greater 
amount therefore there is a net gain. Although 
sterling depreciates the stimulus this gives to 
boosting exports is completely offset by the 
reduction in demand elsewhere. It takes longer for 
exporting firms to recover from the crisis and a 
significant number go out of business. 
 
A Sustained recession scenario: 
x Interest rates are cut in a responsive approach to 
around 3-3.5 per cent by 2009. A cautious and 
stepwise approach is taken. The Bank of England 
fails to get in front of the curve; 
x Inflationary expectations are a significant concern 
as demand for oil outstrips supply. The price of oil 
increases to above $100 per barrel in 2009 due to 
a combination of OPEC action and 
supply/demand fundamentals; 
x The banks take up the government re-
capitalisation scheme as well as taking advantage 
of the Bank of England schemes. A major problem 
remains exposure to toxic US assets and loans as 
well as how the sector deals with these. There is 
little response from private investors and further 
losses come to light. There is significant disquiet 
about dividends and institutional investors remain 
unhappy with performance. Relations between 
government and the finance sector worsen. Some 
institutions need further help from government. 
The period of re-capitalisation is expected to last 
for about 24-36 months; 
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x Lending behaviour does not change significantly 
causing problems in the real economy. Although 
the base rate is cut, interbank lending remains 
difficult causing financial institutions more 
difficulties. Lending only eases after about 18-24 
months; 
x The impact of the financial sector crisis is sharply 
felt across the real economy for a prolonged 
period of time. Confidence is badly shaken and 
consumption, investment, lending, hiring, training 
and exports are hit hard. Although small and 
medium-sized businesses suffer significant cash-
flow problems with rising insolvencies, the main 
concern is over large firms and falling payrolls. 
Further government intervention is required to 
help financial institutions to cope with the 
increasing demands of companies. The finance 
sector may shed up to 20-30,000 jobs as there is 
a significant contraction in the sector. External 
takeovers cannot be ruled out; 
x Firms shedding labour becomes a major problem 
from 2009 onwards. Unemployment rises 
considerably in 2009 and continues increasing 
into 2010. Households suffer a contraction in 
wealth as incomes fall and asset prices suffer; 
x The housing market suffers a prolonged 
contraction through to the end of 2010 and 
perhaps into early 2011. House prices remain flat 
for about 5-8 years before growth is seen again; 
x Government debt and imbalances grow in 2009 
and in 2010. The planned economic recovery is 
not as effective as thought and takes significantly 
longer. Government debt is favourable when 
compared to some other developed nations (as a 
percentage of GDP) but is forecast to climb 
perhaps by a further 5 percentage points from its 
current forecast in the period 2010 to 2015 and 
x Exports fall as domestic demand in the US and 
Euro Area contract. Imports to the UK fall by a 
greater amount therefore there is a small net gain. 
Sterling depreciates in 2008 but then falls further 
again as the economic crisis worsens. This gives 
the basis for an export led recovery as the Euro 
Area recovers slightly. 
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A review of Scottish 
Business Surveys  
July – October 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall 
Negative trends were widely reported in most surveys. The 
PMI Scotland Report for September noted a ‘further 
marked deterioration in operating conditions in the Scottish 
private sector. Output, new business and backlogs of work 
all declined during September’. The Lloyds TSB Scotland 
Business Monitor noted ‘growth in the Scottish economy 
grinding to a halt in the summer of 2008’. The Scottish 
Chambers of Commence, commenting on their latest 
survey, talked of the ‘looming recession’ and ‘harsh trading 
conditions’. Scottish Engineering and CBI trends reported 
falling order intake for the first time for four years. The SRC 
Scottish Retail Sales Monitor reported the flat trend (0.0%) 
in the year on year trend in like for like sales and 
commented on the ‘worst Scottish sales since March 2006’ 
(the previous Monitor had noted the worst August sales 
since 2005). 
  
Whilst record weak trends were reported as indicative of 
the impact of the recession in the ‘real economy’ it is 
important to consider the methodology adopted by most 
business surveys. Most national surveys, seek evidence as 
to changing trends, and use net balances as the key 
survey statistic. Typically surveys ask their respondents to 
indicate whether the trend, over the past three months, and 
expected for the next three months, is either 'up', 'level' or 
'down'. The net balance for such survey questions is 
defined as the number of 'up' responses minus the number 
of 'down' responses to each survey question. Hence a 
positive net balance indicates a rising trend, and a negative 
net balance a declining trend.  The current strong negative 
trends in business confidence, for example, widely reported 
in recent months, can be interpreted as either evidence of 
more strongly declining falls in business confidence, or as 
weakening trends in business confidence being more 
broadly reported. It is important to look behind the headline 
trends to understand more clearly the experiences and 
expectations amongst Scottish business as to the severity 
of the likely recession. There is clear evidence of reduced 
levels of activity in manufacturing, construction and tourism 
compared to a year ago, and sales trends are likewise 
weaker than for some time. Recruitment activity and total 
hours worked are likewise weaker than in 2007. 
Nevertheless, the alarmist interpretations of these results 
should be treated with some caution. 
 
Production 
The Lloyds TSB Scotland Monitor (to end August 2008) 
reported modestly rising trends, but noted these were 
markedly weaker than a year ago. Looking forward (to end 
February 2009) 40% of respondents anticipate a decline in 
the volume of business, although modestly rising trends in 
export activity are forecast; however costs pressures are 
expected to remain widespread with 71% anticipate rising 
costs over the next six months. 
 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Confidence and Orders 
Business confidence, where reported, was widely 
depressed, more so than trends in business activity. The 
Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey and PMI Scotland 
Report, both to the end September, noted a slight 
improvement (although within the context of continuing 
weakening trends) in manufacturing output, new orders 
and backlogs of work. Nevertheless, the accompanying 
commentary focussed on ‘faltering market conditions’, a 
‘sharp contraction in new orders’ and ‘a significant 
contraction in the level-of-work in hand’. A slight downturn 
in manufacturing orders was also noted in the third quarter 
results for Scottish Engineering, The CBI manufacturing 
survey asks if order books are above, at or below normal 
levels, their latest surveys suggest declining current and 
future order book trends becoming more broadly based.  
 
 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey noted a net of 
small, medium and larger firms reporting declining trends in 
the level of work in progress. Unlike other surveys the 
Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey seeks evidence as to 
average capacity used and noted this had eased further to 
73.6%, some five percentage points lower than a year ago, 
and the percentage reporting capacity used being below 
preferred levels had risen to 65%, some fifteen percentage 
higher than a year ago.  
 
 
Costs/Prices 
The PMI report noted input prices ‘rose at a considerable 
pace during September.’ Rising costs prices remain 
evident. In the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey the 
proportion reporting being under pressure to raise prices 
due to raw material costs has averaged over 80% in 2008, 
the proportion reporting increased pressures due to other 
overheads (utility, insurance and other charges) has 
increased by some thirteen percentage points and 
transport costs by twenty one percentage points in 2008, 
and was widely reported by panel members of the PMI 
Report. Both the PMI Report and the Scottish Chambers’ 
Business Survey noted a slight easing in the rate of 
increases in prices charged. 
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Employment 
Scottish Engineering reported modestly rising trends in 
employment, although weaker than in previous quarters, 
‘overall demand for staff is being maintained particularly for 
small companies’. In contrast the PMI Report noted ‘job 
losses in manufacturing were considerable’ as it reported 
the third month of declining trends. The Scottish Chambers’ 
Business Survey noted a slight decline. A closer 
examination of the results in the three surveys show 
strongly similar patterns, the majority of respondents (74% 
in the PMI Report, 64% in Scottish Engineering and 71% in 
the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey) reported no 
change and the percentages reporting increasing levels in 
employment in the third quarter ranged from 7% in the PMI 
Report, 11% in the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey to 
22% in the Scottish Engineering Quarterly Review). Both 
the Scottish Engineering and Scottish Chambers’ quarterly 
surveys reported slightly more respondents reporting a 
weakening in total hours worked.  
 
Average pay increases in manufacturing have remained 
around 3.66% through the year. 
 
 
Construction 
 
Confidence and Orders 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey noted the 
percentage of firms reporting declining business 
confidence was the highest ever reported. Eighty per cent 
reported being less confident than a year ago, again 
reflecting concerns as to credit issues and the sharply 
declining trends in domestic/house build contracts.  
 
The declining trend in new contracts strengthened in the 
third quarter, with a sharp downturn in the trends in private 
commercial and domestic/ house build contracts, and more 
modestly declining trends in public sector work. Now only 
41% (52%, 69%, 71% and 86% in the previous four 
quarters) expect level or rising trends in the level of work 
through the next six months. 
 
Expectations as to turnover trends over the next year have 
weakened significantly over the past two quarters. In the 
third quarter a net of 37% (25% in quarter two) anticipate 
declining turnover trends over the next year (in contrast 
rising net trends of 3%, 10% and 29% were reported in the 
preceding three quarters). A net of -54% (-49% and -3% in 
the previous two quarters) anticipate declining profitability 
over the next twelve months. Seventy-four per cent of 
construction firms anticipate declining tender margins over 
the next twelve months.  
 
Average capacity declined to 79%, down nine percentage 
points over the year, and 43% reported and 59% expect a 
declining trend in the level of work in progress, again the 
weakest trends in the history of the survey.  
 
Costs/Prices 
Expectations of lower trends in turnover and tender 
margins in 2009 were widely reported in the Scottish 
Chambers’ Business Survey for the third quarter as were 
rising trends in building and other costs. 
 
Employment 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey notes a slight 
weakening trend in employment in the third quarter, 
although rising trends in overtime were noted; looking 
ahead to the fourth quarter, expectations of staff and 
overtime reductions are more broadly based. Possibly 
more significant is the declining proportions of firms 
seeking to recruit, down fifty-one percentage points over 
the year. 
 
Average pay increase in quarter three eased slightly to an 
average of 4.11%. 
 
 
The Service Sector 
 
Both the PMI Report and The Lloyds TSB Monitor noted a 
decline in service sector activity. The PMI noted declining 
trends being reported in business, financial services and 
tourism. The Lloyds TSB Monitor noted ‘service businesses 
are affected more than manufacturing’, with service sector 
turnover now having fallen for five consecutive quarters. 
The PMI and Lloyds TSB Monitor both noted declining 
trends in volumes of repeat and new business. 
Expectations for the six months to February 2009 remain 
depressed. All the main surveys noted strongly rising cost 
pressures.  
 
  
Retail distribution 
 
Optimism and Sales 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey reported that the 
widespread deterioration in business confidence continued, 
reflecting continued concerns as to declining consumer 
confidence, credit restrictions and spending. The 
Chambers’ survey noted declining business confidence in 
2008 has consistently been the most broadly based ever 
recorded by the survey. 
 
The Scottish Retail Consortium – Nielson Shop Price Index 
(September) noted year on year price inflation in Scotland 
at 4.3%, but with some signs of easing prices as some of 
the earlier cost price increase in food start to annualise. 
However like-for-like sales were flat in September (a 
combination of rising food and falling non-food sales), and 
total sales in September were 4.6% higher than a year ago, 
but this rise was only due to rising food sales, non food 
sales fell slightly in September.  
 
Both the CBI and Scottish Chambers’ Business Surveys 
reported declining sales trends. Half of the retailers in the 
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October CBI survey, and 59% of retailers in the Scottish 
Chambers Survey (three months to end September) 
reported declining sales trends. 
 
Costs/Prices 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey noted cost 
pressures were again more evident in the third quarter with 
over 70% citing raw material and utility costs, and over 
65% citing transport costs. Cost pressures were again 
more widely reported by independent retailers.  
 
Employment 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey noted changes in 
employment levels were by less than a quarter of 
respondents, nevertheless, declining trends in full time, 
temporary and permanent employment and overtime 
working were reported.   In common with other sectors the 
proportion seeking to recruit staff in the third quarter was 
significantly lower than a year ago. Average pay increases 
in the third quarter were reported at 4.32%, slightly higher 
than earlier in the year. 
 
 
Tourism 
 
Optimism and Demand 
Weaker trends in business confidence were widely 
reported in the third quarter by the Scottish Chambers’ 
Business Survey. Visit Scotland noted bed and room 
occupancy some 3% lower in August 2008 compared to 
same month in 2007, whilst the Scottish Chambers’ Survey 
data for the three months to end September reported 
occupancy some five percentage points lower than a year 
ago.  
 
Weak trends in demand were more widely reported than in 
previous third quarters for the past ten years of the Scottish 
Chambers survey, with weaker trends in demand for 
restaurants and function/conference facilities.  
 
A net of -33% reported declining turnover trends 
(compared to a decline of – 8% and increases of 10% and 
38% in the previous quarters) and a net of -43.5% (-22.4%, 
-34% and -5% in the previous three quarters) reported 
falling trends in margins. Overall tourist demand accounted 
for 54.2% of total demand with local trade generating 
25.5% and the balance was business demand. 
 
Underlying these trends was a lack of demand, reported by 
90% of respondents to the Scottish Chambers’ Business 
Survey. 
 
Employment   
Changes in employment levels were reported by 38%, net 
declining trends in full time, part time, seasonal and 
overtime working were reported. In common with other 
sectors the proportion seeking to recruit staff in the third 
quarter of 2008 was more than ten percentage points lower 
than a year ago. 
 
Outlook 
 
All surveys note the slowing down in the Scottish economy 
becoming more evident over the third quarter, with the 
services sector being more affected than manufacturing. 
Manufacturing still expects better trends in export orders, 
but this will depend on developments in the main markets. 
Results in the construction sector remain dominated by the 
housing market; although the levels of public sector work 
appear less affected. Tender prices and margins are 
expected to remain depressed over the next year. In the 
services sector sales trends, and expectations for the next 
quarter, remain weak. Activity will be affected by continuing 
credit concerns, weakening demand and recession in 
major markets. Declining consumer confidence is 
widespread. Developments in the international economy 
will be the key factor over the next months. 
 
Eleanor Malloy/Cliff Lockyer 
28 October 2008 
 
Current trends in Scottish Business are regularly reported 
by a number of business surveys.  This report draws on:  
 
1.  The Bank of Scotland’s Leading Indicators published   
September 2008 and Quarterly Labour Market Report 
      for the second quarter of 2008; 
 
2.  The Confederation of British Industries Scottish 
Industrial Trends Survey for the quarter to September 
2008; 
 
3.  Lloyds TSB Business Monitor for the quarter to August 
2008 and expectations to February 2009; 
 
4.  Scottish Engineering’s Quarterly Review for the third 
quarter 2008; 
 
5.  The Royal Bank of Scotland’s Monthly Purchasing 
Managers’ Index to end September 2008; 
 
6.  The Scottish Retail Consortium’s Monthly Scottish Retail 
Sales Monitor to October 2008; 
 
7.  The Scottish Retail Consortium - Nielsen Shop Price 
Index for September 2008; 
 
8.  The Scottish Chambers of Commerce Quarterly 
Business Survey, reports for the second and third 
quarters of  2008; 
 
9. BRC-KPMG Retail sales monitor September 2008; 
 
10. Halifax House Price Index October 2008; 
 
11. Visit Scotland Occupancy Index to August 2008. 
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Overview of the 
Scottish labour 
market 
 
Comparable figures on the labour market1 between 
Scotland and the United Kingdom in the second quarter of 
2008 are summarised in Table 1. Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) data show that in the second three months of 2008 
the level of employment in Scotland rose by 0.2 per cent, to 
2,543 thousand. Over the year to June 2008, however, 
employment in Scotland fell by 13 thousand, approximately 
0.5 per cent. For the same period, UK employment rose by 
1.3 per cent. The Scottish employment rate – those in 
employment as a percentage of the working age population 
– was 76.4 per cent, unchanged on the previous quarter 
but down 0.7 per cent compared to one year earlier.  
 
Figure 1 provides an account of Scottish quarterly LFS 
employment over a sixteen-year period to the most recent 
quarter – the earliest for which comparable figures are 
available. Employment levels remain close to historical 
highs, reached in Q2 2007. A comparison of the residence-
based employment rates for the regions of the UK in Q2 
2008 is provided in Figure 2. Scotland’s employment rate 
gives it the fourth highest employment rate of all regions in 
the UK, behind the South East, South West and East of 
England. Figure 3 shows that as well as in Scotland, five 
other regions of the UK have seen a fall in the employment 
rate in the last twelve months, with greatest fall (-1.1 per 
cent) seen in the North East. 
 
Table 1 shows that for Scotland the preferred International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) measure of unemployment fell 
by 9.3 per cent to 113 thousand, between the first and 
second quarters of 2008. This equates to a 7.5 per cent 
annual decline in the number unemployed under this 
measure2. The ILO unemployment rate fell in the three 
months to June 2008 and now stands at 4.2 per cent. This 
represents a 0.5 per cent fall over the last quarter and a 0.3 
per cent fall relative to the same period a year earlier (4.5 
per cent). The comparable ILO unemployment rate for the 
UK stands at 5.4 per cent, and is up 0.2 per cent over the 
most recent quarter, and unchanged relative to the same 
period a year earlier. Figure 4 shows the ILO 
unemployment rate for Scotland and the UK from Q2 1992 
to Q2 2008. This shows that Scotland’s ILO unemployment 
rate has been below that of the UK since the start of 2006, 
and was previously only below that of the UK when both 
rates were significantly higher in the period to the mid-
1990s. 
 
The economically active workforce includes those 
individuals actively seeking employment and those 
currently in employment (i.e. self-employed, government 
employed, unpaid family workers and those on training 
programmes). Table 1 shows that the level of the 
economically active fell by 0.2 per cent between Q1 2008 
and Q2 2008. There were 2,655 thousand economically 
active people in Scotland during Q2 2008. This comprised 
2,543 thousand in employment and 113 thousand ILO 
unemployed. The level for those of working age 
economically inactive rose in the last quarter, up 2.3 per 
cent on the previous quarter to 644 thousand people. This 
indicates an increase of 5.2 per cent in the number of 
people of working age economically inactive over the last 
year.  
 
The most recent (seasonally adjusted) figure for 
Jobseekers allowance claimants in Scotland stood at 81.8 
thousand in September 2008, up 3.1 thousand from the 
previous month. The claimant count rate in September 
2008 stood at 3.0 per cent. This is up 0.1 per cent from the 
previous month, but up 0.5 per cent since the start of 2008. 
In April 2008, the Scottish claimant count rate was identical 
to the UK claimant count rate at 2.5 per cent, but both have 
risen in the last five months. The UK claimant count rate in 
September was slightly lower than the Scottish rate at 2.9 
per cent. Figure 5 shows the claimant count rates for 
Scotland and the UK since comparable records began in 
April 1974. Over this period, the Scottish claimant count 
rate has historically been greater than the UK claimant 
count rate. 
 
Figure 6 shows the inflows, outflow, and net flows onto 
Jobseekers Allowance in Scotland between November 
1988 and the most recent data (July 2008). The reduction 
in the claimant count unemployment over recent years can 
be seen by the greater outflows than inflows over much of 
this time period. The recent sharp increase in claimant 
count levels can be seen by the increase in the scale of 
inflows to Jobseekers allowance since March 2008, while 
the number of outflows from Jobseekers allowance have 
remained approximately constant. Since June 2008, more 
than 2000 additional people a month in Scotland have 
begun receiving Jobseekers Allowance than have stopped 
receiving Jobseekers Allowance. 
  
Figure 7 plots ILO and claimant count unemployment in 
Scotland for three-month periods as an index for the period 
Q1 1999 to Q2 2008 (where on both series Q1 1999 = 
100). Claimant count unemployment has generally fallen 
over this period, and, after a slight rise during 2006, has 
recently begun declining again. The largest increases seen 
in the claimant count measure of unemployment in the 
most recent months is not seen in this diagram since it 
ends at Q2 2008. By comparison, ILO unemployment has 
fluctuated widely, but still generally on a downward trend 
and most likely reflects movements between the level of 
employment and the number of people economically active 
at any one time. Hence, the difference between the ILO 
and claimant count definitions mirrors the distinction 
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between those actively seeking work (but are jobless) and 
those who are eligible for unemployment benefit payments.  
 
Due to changes in the way in which these data are 
collected, consistent data on the level of unfilled vacancies 
in the Scottish and Great Britain labour market are only 
available from May 2006. We report standard live unfilled 
vacancies, which are vacancies for an employee (rather 
than self-employed) person and are notified through a 
Jobcentre. The proportion of total vacancies which this 
measure represents will therefore change over time as the 
industrial sector and region of the vacancies changes. 
Such measures are useful however for a snapshot of 
vacancies in the Scottish economy. In April 2008 there 
were a total of 31,592 live unfilled vacancies, with 4,457 
“skilled” vacancies across Scotland. Figure 8 shows the 
spread by local authority of the “skilled” vacancies3 across 
Scotland in April 2008 and then in September 2008. While 
the largest number of such posts in September 2008 are in 
Edinburgh and Glasgow, as in April 2008, the number of 
“skilled” vacancies in Edinburgh is slightly over half of 
those available in Glasgow. 
 
The most recent figures for the number of employee jobs 
by industrial activity are detailed in Table 2. Employee job 
figures are a measure of jobs rather than people. Total 
seasonally adjusted employee jobs for the quarter ending 
June 2008 stood at 2,387 thousand, unchanged from the 
previous quarter, and 7 thousand higher than the same 
period a year earlier. The number of jobs in the 
manufacturing industry continues to fall, and now stands at 
218 thousand, down 2 thousand from the previous quarter, 
and down 6 thousand against the same quarter one year 
earlier. The number of jobs in the service industry rose by 5 
thousand over the last quarter to 1,112 thousand, and 
there are now 12 thousand more jobs in the service 
industry than the same period ending a year earlier.  
 
Outlook  
Scotland’s labour market continues to perform strongly in 
light of extreme global uncertainty. The level of 
employment has risen in the second quarter of 2008, while 
over the last year the employment rate has fallen slightly. 
Overall Scottish employment growth has been stronger 
than in UK over the last quarter, while the opposite is true 
for the last year. Scotland’s unemployment levels and 
rates, on both ILO and claimant count measures continue 
to be close to historical lows – although data for 
performance since quarter two confirms that both these 
measures of unemployment are increasing. 
 
While the employment level has fallen from the high seen 
in Q2 2007, it remains relatively close to its highest level 
since 1992 (before which consistent records are 
unavailable). The employment rate in Scotland remains 
above that of the UK (76.4 per cent compared to 74.8 per 
cent). Since the start of 2008, there has been an increase 
in the level and rate for unemployment on both ILO and 
claimant count measures. The Scottish claimant count rate 
rose to 3.0 per cent in September 2008, slightly above the 
UK claimant count rate. The outlook for the Scottish labour 
market in the medium-term remains robust, however we 
are uncertain as to the impact of continued, and deepened, 
economic uncertainty on labour market indicators. The 
service sector, particularly in financial services and 
ancillary business services, has been the engine of the 
recent growth in Scottish employment and any changes in 
these sectors may have damaging short-term 
consequences for the Scottish labour market. 
  
_____________________  
 
Endnotes:  
1The Census 2001-consistent population figures at local authority 
level were released in February 2003. This has allowed the 
production of interim regional LFS estimates. The population data 
only cover the periods up to mid-2001. The data presented here 
are taken mainly from Labour Market Statistics, May 2008 and are 
consistent with the updated LFS data available on NOMIS from 
Summer 2004. Labour Market Statistics continue to report data for 
Scotland at the quarterly level, so this will continue to form the 
basis of our analysis of movements in the labour market between 
quarters.  
2The Labour Force Survey definition of ILO unemployment takes 
precedence over the claimant count measure. ILO unemployment 
is much less sensitive to changes in the regulations governing 
unemployment benefit, and conforms to a widely accepted 
standard to allow for more meaningful cross-country comparisons.  
3Highly skilled jobs include sections 1-3 of the Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC), covering “Managers and senior 
officials”, “Professional Occupations” and “Associate Professional 
and Technical Occupations”. 
 
 
Grant Allan  
24 October 2008
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Table 1:  Headline indicators for Scottish and UK labour market, Q2 2008 
 
April to June 2008  Scotland 
Change 
on 
quarter 
(%) 
Change 
on year 
(%) 
United 
Kingdom 
Change 
on 
quarter 
(%) 
Change 
on year 
(%) 
 
Level (000s) 2,543 0.2 -0.5 29,558  -0.1 0.3 Employment* 
Rate (%) 76.4 0.0 -0.7 74.8 -0.1 -0.3 
        
Level (000s)          113 -9.3 -7.5   1,672  3.7 0.9 
Unemployment** 
Rate (%) 4.2 -0.5 -0.3 5.4 0.2 0.0 
        
Level (000s)       2,655 -0.2 -0.8 31,151  0.4 1.2 
Activity* 
Rate (%) 79.9 -0.4 -0.9 79.1 0.0 0.3 
        
Level (000s)          644 2.3 5.2   7,876 0.0 -1.1 
Inactivity*** 
Rate (%) 20.1 0.4 0.9       20.9  0.0 -0.3 
 
Source: Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, August 2008  
 
  * Levels are for those aged 16+, while rates are for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 ** Levels and rates are for those aged 16+, rates are proportion of economically active. 
*** Levels and rates for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Employee jobs by industry, Scotland, June 2008 
 
 
 
All jobs 
(seasonally 
adjusted) All jobs 
Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fishing 
Mining 
Energy and 
Water 
Supplies 
Industries 
Manufacturing 
Industries Construction 
Distribution 
etc, transport 
etc, finance 
and business 
services 
Education, 
health, public 
admin and 
other services 
SIC 2003 
Section  A-O A,B C,E D F H-K L-O 
Jun 05       2,361        2,358  31 37 234 119 1,096 840 
Jun 06       2,382        2,379  30 37 225 139 1,097 851 
Jun 07       2,380        2,377  32 39 224 140 1,100 842 
Sep 07        2,383        2,380  32 40 223 136 1,106 843 
Dec 07       2,387        2,399  31 39 221 136 1,125 847 
Mar 08        2,387        2,378  32 39 220 133 1,107 847 
Jun 08       2,387        2,385  33 39 218 131 1,112 851 
 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland, October 2008 
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Figure 1:  Total (16+) employment in Scotland, Q2 1992 to Q2 2008, seasonally adjusted 
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Source:  Labour Force Survey, National Statistics 
 
Figure 2:  Residence based employment rates for Scotland and other regions of UK, Q2 2008 
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Figure 3:  Change in residence based employment rate for Scotland and other regions of the UK to Q2 2008 
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Figure 4:  Scotland and UK ILO unemployment rate, Q2 1992 to Q2 2008 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1992 Q2 1994 Q2 1996 Q2 1998 Q2 2000 Q2 2002 Q2 2004 Q2 2006 Q2 2008 Q2
Quarter
IL
O
 
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e
Scotland
UK
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, National Statistics 
 
PAGE 38 VOLUME 32  NUMBER 2 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Figure 5:  Scotland and UK monthly Claimant Count rate, April 1974 to September 2008 
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Figure 6:  Scotland inflows, outflows and net flows to Jobseekers allowance, November 1988 to September 2008 
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Figure 7:  ILO and claimant count unemployment in Scotland, Q1 1999 to Q2 2008, index Q1 1999 = 100 
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Figure 8:  Live unfilled vacancies for “skilled”3 occupations in Scotland by local authority area, April 2008 and 
September 2008 
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How can we measure 
Scotland’s footprint? 
(and, once we have, 
what do we do with 
it?) 
 
by Karen Turner 
 
* Dr Karen Turner is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of 
Economics, University of Strathclyde, a Research Associate at the 
Fraser of Allander Institute, and recently appointed ESRC Climate 
Change Leadership Fellow. This article has been written with the 
support of the ESRC (Grant reference: RES-066-27-0029), but 
draws liberally on earlier research activity sponsored by the 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency, reported in Turner 
(2008), and by EPSRC via the Supergen Marine Consortium.  
 
Introduction 
Recent months have seen a great deal of interest and 
consultation in Scotland regarding environmental and 
carbon accounting in general, and the calculation and use 
of ecological and carbon footprints in particular. Ecological 
footprints are concerned with the global impacts of our 
consumption decisions in terms of resource use (most 
commonly focussing on land use), while carbon footprints 
are concerned with the pollution side of the equation, 
carbon emissions around the world engendered by our 
consumption activities. Footprint measures are powerful 
pedagogic tools for raising interest in, and awareness of, 
ecological and sustainability issues, and have some 
valuable characteristics. The notion that consumption is the 
ultimate driving force behind resource use and pollution 
generation is a key ecological and economic perspective. 
Even if our focus is on national targets (for example, 
meeting UK Kyoto agreements on reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions), it is important to emphasise the fact that 
domestic production of goods and services requires a 
complex interaction between economic sectors, often 
scattered around the world. In footprint calculations, a large 
proportion of the resource use and/or pollution generation 
indirectly embedded in Scottish consumption will occur 
outwith the boundaries of Scotland (and/or the UK). On the 
other hand, a large proportion of resource use and pollution 
generation in Scotland will be driven by consumption 
decisions in other regions and nations. Thus, in tackling 
global sustainability problems at the regional or national 
level, we need examine resource use and pollution 
generation under what are referred to as ‘consumption 
accounting principles’ as well the ‘production accounting 
principles’ reflected in standard resource use or emissions 
inventories.1  
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However, while footprint measures should, in principle, give 
us an indicator that captures resource use and/or pollution 
generation according to consumption accounting principles, 
this article argues that two important issues should be 
considered before further investment is made in 
constructing footprints for Scotland: 
 
1. Can (ecological or carbon) footprints currently be 
calculated accurately for Scotland, and in a way 
that is comparable with measures for other 
regions/countries? 
 
2. Even if we can make accurate and comparable 
footprint measures, would these be any more than 
contextual indicators that can be monitored, rather 
than measures of progress that can be influenced 
by policy and other human actions? 
 
This article considers each of these questions in turn. 
 
The need for transparency, analytical rigour, coverage and 
consistency in footprint measures, and the application of 
input-output accounting techniques 
 
A crucial problem with past footprint measures (including, 
but not limited to, Best Foot Forward Ltd’s 2004 ecological 
footprint analysis for Scotland) has been a lack of 
transparency, clarity and standardisation in the accounting 
methods used. Economic measures, such as GDP, are 
constructed using internationally agreed accounting 
techniques, and the methods recommended and used 
detailed in publicly available documents published by 
relevant statistical agencies. In contrast, accounting 
methods and data sources for footprint measures tend to 
have been somewhat opaque and incomplete in terms of 
coverage of consumption activities and supply chain 
activities, as well as being inconsistently calculated across 
different countries and regions. However, reflecting the 
growing policy, business and public interest in footprint 
calculations, there have recently been developments in the 
academic literature to develop standardised techniques 
using a basic accounting approach that is both transparent 
and analytically rigorous. This approach is standard input-
output analysis applied in a multi-region or country context.  
 
Input-output (hereafter IO) analysis is based around a set 
of sectorally disaggregated economic accounts (such as 
those published for Scotland by the Scottish Government 
on an annual basis). In these accounts, the inputs to each 
industrial sector, and the subsequent uses of the output for 
those sectors (by other local sectors and different types of 
internal and external consumers), are separately identified. 
The primary function of IO analysis is to quantify the 
interdependence of sectors within the economy: that is, the 
extent to which the output of one sector is used as 
intermediate inputs in the production of other sectors. For 
example, imagine that electricity is used in the production 
of plastics, which are then used as an intermediate input in 
the production of cars, which are subsequently sold to local 
consumers. IO provides useful mathematical routines to 
track this energy (and all other direct and indirect 
intermediate) use embodied within local consumption and 
other elements of final demand.  
 
IO therefore provides an ideal framework for economic-
environmental accounting. If the economic information in 
the standard economic IO accounts can be augmented 
with environmental information relating pollution generation 
and/or resource use to direct production and consumption 
activity, the formidable analytical tools associated with IO 
can be utilised. This was first recognised by Leontief 
(1970), but has been picked up more recently in numerous 
academic studies that have attempted to develop on 
Wackernagel and Rees’s (1996, 1997) initial ecological 
footprint concept using IO accounting techniques (see 
Wiedmann et al, 2007, for a comprehensive review). As 
explained by Turner et al. (2007a) this would seem a 
natural development, given that the focus of ecological 
and/or carbon footprints is to capture the total (direct plus 
indirect) resource use and/or carbon generation embodied 
in final consumption in an economy: this is exactly what 
standard IO ‘multiplier’ analysis does. Building on earlier 
work by Munksgaard and Pedersen (2001), Turner et al. 
(2007a) go on to derive a multi-region input-output method 
that is appropriate for accounting for emissions and/or 
resource use under the production and consumption 
accounting principles (and also determining environmental 
trade balances as the difference between the two, equating 
to the differences between resource use and/or emissions 
embodied in imports and exports to/from the target region).  
 
However, while the multi-region input-output approach to 
accounting for emissions generation within countries and 
emissions embodied in trade flows seems to have become 
accepted in the academic community, it has not yet 
become common-place in the wider policy and consulting 
arena. This is most likely in part due to issues of data 
availability, as a full footprint calculation requires: 
 
 
1. Domestic input-output accounts reported in an 
appropriate ‘analytical’ format (symmetric industry-
by-industry or commodity-by-commodity matrices 
reported in basic, producer prices); 
 
2. Physical pollution and/or resource use coefficients 
for each sector and consumer, to give a set of 
environmental IO accounts (with guidance in the 
form of the Eurostat NAMEA2 format initiated by 
Haan, 2001, and applied to the UK by Vaze, 
1999); 
 
3. 1 and 2 for each direct or indirect trading partner 
Interregional and  
 
4. international trade flow data in corresponding IO 
format. 
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Other issues that are likely to have so far constrained the 
application of IO methods for footprint calculations are a 
lack of policy case studies and the relatively recent nature 
of developments in the academic literature, as well as the 
need for non-technical translation and focussed 
dissemination of these developments.  
 
However, in the case of Scotland, the policy, research, 
consulting and business communities have recently begun 
to put a great deal of effort into addressing these issues, 
particularly in the context of carbon accounting. In large 
part initiated by the work of the Scottish Government’s 
Steering Group on Additional Measures of Progress3 and 
by the recently formed Scottish Carbon Counting Group, a 
number of open seminars and workshops have been held 
in Scotland in 2008, with representation from all four broad 
communities list above, to discuss appropriate accounting 
techniques and their practical applicability. Particular focus 
was given to input-output techniques in a workshop 
sponsored by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, 
SEPA) to inform the activities of the Scottish Government’s 
Steering Group on Additional Measures of Progress.4 This 
workshop was run by the author of this paper, and included 
a presentation by Professor Max Munday from the Welsh 
Economic Research Unit and ESRC-sponsored BRASS 
centre in Cardiff, who has been involved in similar 
consultation and developments with regard to economic-
environmental accounting and footprint measures in Wales 
(see Jones et al, 2006, and Munday and Roberts, 2006). A 
report on this workshop (Turner, 2008) is available from the 
author on request5, but a key outcome was a broad 
consensus on the following points: 
 
 “While the development of the IO framework is 
resource-intensive, if we have faith in market-
based solutions to the problem of climate change, 
we absolutely need to adopt an IO approach. 
 
 Uses of an environmental IO approach are not 
limited to footprint calculations. It would facilitate 
the construction of a wide range of environmental 
indicators. Therefore, it is likely to represent ‘good 
value for money’ to policymakers. 
 
 IO analysis would allow us to develop a better 
understanding of domestic and direct emissions 
generation as well as the indirect effects that can 
be measured through multiplier analysis”.  
Turner (2008b, pp.5-6) 
 
At the UK level in particular, there have also been 
developments in terms of more policy-orientated cases 
studies, with key proponents of the IO approach to footprint 
calculations in the consulting community being the 
Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), and with crucial 
interaction on the academic side by the ESRC-sponsored 
RESOLVE unit at the University of Surrey (see, for 
example, Druckman et al, 2008). However, a crucial 
problem in the UK context, despite early developments in 
the practical application of environmental IO analysis 
originating with ONS (Vaze, 1997), is the fact that the last 
set of UK IO tables in the appropriate ‘analytical’ format for 
multiplier analyses such as footprint calculations were 
constructed for 1995.  
 
Given that the economic and environmental positions of 
Scotland are clearly closely interrelated with those of other 
regions in the UK, and the UK national economy in general, 
the absence of appropriate UK IO data is a serious 
impediment to accurate carbon accounting for Scotland. 
However, Scotland has a very strong foundation of its own 
in terms of IO accounting. The Scottish IO team, based 
within the Office of the Chief Economic Adviser, produces 
economic IO accounts in analytical format on an annual 
basis, and consults regularly on potential developments of 
this basic framework through its Input-Output Expert User 
Group. Experimental interregional and international trade 
flow data (item 4 above), reporting Scotland’s imports from 
both the rest of the UK and the rest of the world broken 
down by commodity have been produced (and used in 
limited pilot applications of the multi-region IO framework 
by Ferguson et al (2004) and McGregor et al (2004, 2008). 
Moreover, the Scottish Government has supported 
exploratory work into the extension of the Scottish IO 
framework to environmental applications for a number of 
years. For example, between 2001 and 2004, the (then) 
Scottish Executive ran a Scottish Environmental Accounts 
Working Group, a key output of which was a pilot sectoral 
CO2 account in IO/NAMEA format (see Turner, 2003). 
More recently, following the SEPA-sponsored workshop 
reported in Turner (2008), the Scottish Government’s 
Steering Group on Additional Measures of Progress has 
made recommendations to consider the formal 
development of an environmental IO framework for 
Scotland. In addition, through its participation in Economic 
and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) collaborative 
governmental studentship programme, the Scottish 
Government is co-funding a studentship titled 'The Use of 
Carbon Accounting in Scotland: Consumption and 
Production Based Measures of Carbon Emissions', due to 
begin in 2009, which will involve using IO analysis to 
produce a number of policy case studies applying the 
production and consumption accounting principles (where 
footprints fall under the latter). This brings us to our next 
question: 
 
What could we do with a Scottish 
environmental IO framework? 
As noted above, among the conclusions of the SEPA-
sponsored workshop the potential uses of an 
environmental IO approach are not limited to footprint 
calculations, and would facilitate the construction of a wide 
range of environmental indicators. Munksgaard and 
Pedersen (2001) demonstrate how emissions and/or 
resource use can be accounted for under the production 
and consumption accounting principles using the same IO 
framework, and corresponding environmental ‘trade 
balances’ between any one region/country and the rest of 
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the world derived. Applying the multi-region IO method 
detailed in Turner et al (2007b), McGregor et al (2008) 
demonstrate the corresponding calculation of 
environmental trade balances between any two regions or 
countries (with an illustrative analysis for Scotland and the 
rest of the UK), and how a combination of accounting 
principles can also be applied. For example, they apply the 
consumption accounting principle to trade flows between 
Scotland and the rest of the UK, but the production 
accounting principle at the national, UK, level (to reflect 
concern with domestic emissions generation under the 
Kyoto Protocol). An objective of the aforementioned 
ESRC/Scottish Government collaborative studentship will 
be to develop this analysis, hopefully aided by the 
availability of more robust regional and interregional 
environmental IO data, and drawing on (and perhaps 
collaborating in) developments made by other teams in the 
UK, such as the RESOLVE team at Surrey, and 
internationally (for example, colleagues at the Institute for 
Sustainability Analysis in Sydney are currently engaged in 
developing an international multi-region environmental IO 
framework). 
 
However, in order for Scotland to move forward, and even 
become one of the world leaders in environmental 
accounting, including calculation of footprints, it is crucial to 
lay a solid foundation in terms of developing an appropriate 
economic-environmental accounting framework. At present 
economic and environmental data for Scotland are largely 
reported separately. If we think economic activity is the root 
cause of most environmental problems, we need to link 
and integrate economic and environmental accounts. In 
presenting a pilot NAMEA framework for Scotland, Turner 
(2003) notes that there are two broad issues in terms of 
data requirements that must be considered before a 
sectorally disaggregated economic-environmental 
database can be reported, and “[T]hese are: 
 
1. The availability of region-specific data for Scotland 
on sources and generation of emissions. 
 
2. Even if region-specific emissions data of an 
acceptable quality are available, there is the 
question of whether these can be reported for a 
sectoral breakdown that is consistent the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) used in the 
economic accounts. If policy is orientated towards 
influencing activity in economic sectors, clearly 
there are benefits to environmental data being 
presented in a format that is consistent with 
existing economic accounts.” 
Turner (2003, p.44) 
 
Of course, IO accounting is resource intensive and, 
therefore, further consultation is required in order to identify 
how the greatest value-added can be achieved in terms of 
current policy concerns and objectives within the 
constraints of the availability and resource implications of 
appropriate input-output data. However, investment in an 
appropriate information infrastructure (for a range of 
economic-environmental accounting measures, not limited 
to footprints) would seem to be a more sensible priority 
than further expenditure footprint measures, the accuracy 
and consequent usefulness of which will be negatively 
affected by the absence of accurate data describing the 
economic-environmental relationships that drive our 
footprint.  
 
If we do develop accurate footprint measures 
for Scotland, what can we do with them? 
A second question was raised at the start of this article. 
This was, even if we can make accurate and comparable 
footprint measures, would these be any more than 
contextual indicators that can be monitored, rather than 
measures of progress that can be influenced by policy and 
other human actions? A related question is the regularity of 
reporting. Presumably, we do not want to measure our 
footprint (be it carbon or ecological) once, and leave it at 
that. As Professor Munday argued at the recent SEPA-
sponsored workshop (see Turner, 2008), that if 
government chooses to develop a footprint measure (or 
measures if both ecological and carbon footprints are 
required), this will involve a commitment to estimate the 
selected indicator at regular intervals in order to monitor 
our progress in terms of (hopefully) reducing its value, and 
to do so using consistent methodology.  
 
However, a key problem with a footprint measure, even if it 
is calculated using the type of transparent, rigorous and 
consistent/comparable method facilitated by adopting an IO 
approach, is that is just an indicator. If the value of our 
indicator changes between one year and the next, why did 
it change? If its value is determined by economic decision-
making (e.g. what we consume, the technology we use), 
can we take action to change it? That is, can we reduce 
our footprint? This seems to be the key objective 
underlying measurement of footprints. However, in order to 
understand why our footprint changes over time, we need 
to be able to identify policy leavers and causal relationships 
within the economic system, and between economic and 
environmental factors. That, is we need to have knowledge 
of the transmission mechanism between changes in 
behaviour (which may be induced by policy actions or other 
factors) and the value of different variables that contribute 
to our footprint. 
 
The argument for adopting IO techniques to measure 
indicators such as footprints is that the associated 
multiplier analysis is a powerful accounting tool for 
examining the structure of economic activity and 
associated issues such as the pollution and/or resource 
use engendered or embodied, directly or indirectly, in 
production, consumption and trade flows. However, in 
terms of modelling the impacts of actual or potential 
changes in policy or other conditions, IO is limited. Where 
concern lies in analysing the impacts of changes in policy, 
or other disturbances, on variables of interest, such as 
environmental trade balances, a more flexible modelling 
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framework is required. We require a modelling framework 
that will allow consideration of changes in behaviour on 
both the supply- and demand-sides of the economy, for 
example in response to changes in prices. Such a 
modelling framework6 would use the IO accounting 
framework as a database, and, thus, shares its strengths, 
but introduce more flexible, theory-consistent and realistic 
representations of economic behaviour and relationships. 
 
However, again, developments are already underway in 
this respect for Scotland. In October 2008, the author’s 
team at the Department of Economics and University of 
Strathclyde in Glasgow began work on a project under the 
ESRC Climate Change Leadership Fellowship programme. 
This involves building on the type of IO accounting 
framework outlined above to develop a modelling 
framework that will contribute to ability of policymakers to 
fully assess the impacts of alternative policy options on the 
fulfilment of regional and national targets for reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions. It will also incorporate 
measurement of a range of consumption and production 
based indicators. This work will involve collaboration with 
other researchers in a range of fields (including engineers, 
environmental scientists, economists and other regional 
scientists) and from a number of different countries 
(including the UK, US and Australia) and focus on different 
target economies. However, a basic interregional UK 
model has already been constructed (see Gilmartin et al, 
2008), and will be developed throughout the project, 
though the quality of this development will clearly depend 
on the extent to which investment is made by the Scottish 
Government and ONS in the IO accounting framework 
outlined and recommended above.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This article has raised questions regarding the accurate 
and useful calculation of ecological and/or carbon footprints 
for Scotland. However, it is clear that a number of 
developments are already underway in Scotland to 
enhance our analytical capacity in terms of accounting for 
the environmental impacts of our behaviour and how we 
may improve our performance. Nonetheless, it is crucial 
that we continue to direct our efforts, and our public 
resources, in ways that will ultimately yield the most 
benefits. The core argument put forward here is that we 
must continue to invest in the informational and analytical 
infrastructure, even if this means delaying actual 
measurement of indicators such as ecological or carbon 
footprints. Ultimately, these are only useful to us if they are 
based on good data and sound measurement techniques.  
 
Author note: It is important that the ESRC Climate Change 
Leadership Fellowship project outlined above will also take 
account of stakeholder needs in terms of both accounting 
and modelling work. Formally, this will be done through a 
series of open seminars and workshops, the first of which 
will be held in March 2009, and through a project web-site 
to be set up by the end of the year. Please contact 
karen.turner@strath.ac.uk if you would like to participate in 
any seminars or workshops and/or be placed on the 
mailing list to receive project updates via newsletters and 
non-technical papers. Informal contact is also most 
welcome. 
  
____________________ 
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Endnotes 
1
 The terminology of consumption and production accounting 
principles originated with Munksgaard and Pedersen (2001). 
 
2
 NAMEA is an acronym for National Accounting Matrix including 
Environmental Accounts, which adopts an IO structure, though not 
necessarily in the analytical format required for the type of 
multiplier analysis used in footprint calculations. 
3The Scottish Government convened the Steering Group on 
Additional Measures of Progress in 2006; it reported to Scottish 
ministers in the summer of 2008.  
4
. The purpose of the SEPA-sponsored workshop was to 
investigate issues relating footprint calculations raised by in a 
collaborative paper (Turner et al, 2007b) produced by the Scottish 
Government and Fraser of Allander Institute to inform the Steering 
Group on Additional Measures of Progress regarding the issues 
associated with different composite measures of sustainability. 
5Contact karen.turner@strath.ac.uk
6Referred to as a computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling 
framework. 
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The Trump 
development in 
Aberdeenshire: what 
are the issues? 
 
 
Stewart Dunlop, Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Introduction and background 
The development company set up by Donald Trump, 
Trump International Golf Links Scotland (TIGLS), set out 
plans in 2007 to create a high-quality golf, hotel and 
housing development at the Menie Estate in 
Aberdeenshire. The key facilities involved in the 
development are: 
 
 2 championship quality golf courses, capable of 
hosting major tournaments 
 A golf clubhouse 
 A short game area/driving range 
 A golf academy 
 A 5-star, 450 room hotel 
 A conference area  
 Spa 
 36 Golf Villas 
 950 Holiday Homes 
 500 Private Residential Houses 
 Staff accommodation  
 
 
The original planning application for Menie was 
controversially rejected by Aberdeenshire Council1, one 
main reason being that the TIGLS proposal involved the 
use of a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI, see 
below)2.  Since then, the development process has 
continued with the setting up of a public enquiry into the 
Trump plans. The enquiry, which sat in June this year and 
is expected to report in the autumn, gave all sides an 
opportunity to publicly air their views on the issues 
surrounding the Menie proposal. While the reporters’ 
decision will concern only whether this specific 
development should be allowed to proceed or not, it is 
interesting to consider the issues raised at the enquiry 
within a wider context - in particular, the Trump enquiry 
illustrates, more than any other issue seen in Scotland in 
recent years, the wider question of how to weigh the 
economic benefits that such developments can bring 
against any environmental costs that might ensue. This 
article attempts to examine the economic and 
environmental views forwarded during the enquiry and to 
assess how, in practice, decisions should be made in 
situations where conflicts of this nature occur. Attention will 
also be directed to whether any guidance is available from 
environmental documents published by the Scottish 
Government. 
 
Economic benefits 
From a local economic viewpoint, the proposed Menie 
development is significant in two ways. The first is simply 
the size of the investment planned at Menie. The second, 
discussed further below, relate to how it might impact on 
certain longer term economic issues in the North East.  
 
Firstly, an assessment of the economic benefits of TIGLS 
plans for Menie3 shows that the project is expected to 
create a substantial amount of employment and make a 
significant contribution to Gross Value Added4 (GVA), both 
across Scotland and in the surrounding local economy5. 
Assessments were made of two aspects of the proposed 
development, the economic activity created during the 
construction phase and the more long-lasting employment 
and GVA created once the ranges of facilities outlined 
above are operational. 
 
Construction impact 
Construction impacts are of course short term but, given 
that the proposed facilities are estimated to cost around 
£720 million, they clearly will provide a significant boost to 
construction demand - estimates suggest that the net 
employment created across Scotland by the construction at 
Menie will be between 4,694 - 7,042 Full Time Equivalent 
(FTE) jobs6.  
 
The spread of the employment estimates (the upper and 
lower estimates differ by 2,348 FTE jobs) reflect uncertainty 
about the extent to which the Trump development may 
displace other activity (i.e., may take market share from 
firms in the construction sector). Uncertainty regarding this 
was taken account of by adopting two different 
assumptions regarding displacement (both of which were 
quite high, the argument being that adopting a conservative 
assumption reduced the risk of overstating the economic 
impacts attributable to the project). Using English 
Partnerships guidance7, displacement was assumed to be 
either 25% or 50% - the first assumption causes the net 
activity created to be reduced by 25% while the 50% 
assumption assumes that construction activity elsewhere in 
Scotland will fall by 50%.   
 
The estimates also made some allowance for leakage 
(assumed to be 20%) because some of the jobs created at 
Menie may taken up by residents from outwith the area. 
Finally, no allowance was made for additionality. 
Additionality is generally measured within the context of 
government policy interventions in the economy, and 
attempts to measure the net impact of such interventions. 
However, as no policy support is proposed for the Menie 
development, any activity created is thus wholly additional 
– the assumption is that the activity estimated for the Menie 
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development would not be generated if TIGLS does not 
invest the money required to create the facilities at Menie. 
 
GVA estimates were also produced on the same basis as 
above (25% and 50% displacement, 20% leakage and 
100% additionality) and, on these assumptions, the 
construction of the Menie development was estimated to 
create an additional amount of GVA of £400 million (25% 
displacement) and £267 million (50% displacement). 
 
Locally, construction of the facilities at Menie was 
estimated to create between 2,165 and 1,443 FTE jobs and 
between £120.7 million and £80.5 million worth of 
additional GVA.  
 
Operating impact 
As noted, the construction impacts outlined above are 
short-term, since they will be created only during the period 
that the development is being constructed. In contrast, the 
operational impacts are ongoing and represent annual 
estimates of the extent to which the Trump development 
will add to activity, both in Scotland and locally, as long as 
the Menie development continues to operate. These 
estimates show how the development is locally significant, 
in terms both of its size and its longer term effect on activity 
in the North-East economy. 
 
Using a similar set of assumptions to those outlined above, 
it was estimated that the development would create 
between 1,856 – 1,237 FTE jobs and between £49.2 – 
£32.8 million worth of GVA in Scotland. In the North-East 
(Aberdeenshire/Aberdeen City), the Menie development 
was estimated to create 1,418-945 FTE jobs in and 
between £33.5 million (25% displacement) and £22.3 
million worth of GVA (50% displacement). 
 
The structural impact on the local economy 
Also significant, however, is that the Menie development 
may help to address what local policymakers recognise as 
one of the key threats to the North-East economy, the 
projected decline in activity and employment in the oil 
industry. Oil and gas production form the North Sea has 
fallen considerably in recent years - the Royal Bank of 
Scotland Oil and Gas Index records that the amount of oil 
extracted from the North Sea has fallen continuously, from 
28.9 million barrels per day (bpd) in 1999 to 15.6 bpd in 
2007, a fall of just over 46%. While recent increases in oil 
prices may prolong the life of the local industry to some 
extent, it is clear that oil extraction cannot in the long-term 
continue to act as a major local economic driver.  The 
potential employment decline has been well-recognised by 
local agencies with, for example, North East Scotland 
Economic Research predicting a fall in oil and gas 
employment from 39,000 (2006) to around 25,000 by 
20218. 
 
Several local policymakers emphasised to the Trump 
enquiry the consequent need to diversify the North East 
economy in order to attract jobs to replace those that will 
go as oil and gas declines. They argued that the Menie 
development could make a significant contribution to this 
process, particularly as the tourist aspect of the Menie 
development fitted closely with the area’s agreed 
development strategy. For example, Councillor Anne 
Robertson, the leader of Aberdeenshire Council, referred to 
a Council policy document9 which identifies one council 
objective as being to acquire a world class reputation for 
recreational tourism by 2011. She argued that the Menie 
development will enhance the areas reputation globally by 
providing Aberdeenshire with a world class tourist facility. 
Aberdeen and Grampian Chamber of Commerce argued 
that peripherality had meant that Aberdeenshire had 
always struggled with what it could offer in terms of 
tourism, and that the areas relative lack of world-class 
tourist attractions had hitherto been a barrier to developing 
local tourism10. While the size of the Menie development is 
significant in itself, local policymakers also made plain in 
their statements to the enquiry that the type of 
development involved was equally important, particularly in 
terms of the local diversification strategy. 
 
As to whether developing tourism might represent a policy 
of “backing winners”, recent figures appear to confirm that 
it may be so. Tourism activity in Scotland has grown 
substantially in recent years, and Scotland has also out-
performed the UK in this respect.  Scottish Government 
figures11 shows that the number of employees in tourism 
grew by 19.1% between 1998-2005, and the proportion of 
all UK tourism turnover accounted for by Scottish tourism 
increased from 6.6% to 7.7% over the same period. Local 
feelings surrounding the appeal of tourism also appear to 
chime with the Scottish Government’s plan to increase the 
number of tourists visiting Scotland. In “Scottish Tourism- 
the Next Decade”12 the Government points out that global 
growth in tourism is expected to be between to 4-5%, and 
Visit Scotland has made encouraging golf tourism a 
primary focus of marketing activities. 
 
Environmental issues 
While the proposed Trump development therefore 
promises substantial economic benefits for the local area 
and also appears to be highly consistent with the perceived 
future strategic needs of the North-East economy, the 
enquiry also addressed potential environmental losses, 
argued to be both nationally and locally significant. What 
were the views of those environmentalists who argued 
against the development? 
 
The key objection advanced by, among others, the Royal 
Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), was the 
potential for the Menie development to adversely affect the 
area’s natural heritage. Their argument principally 
concerned the importance of the landforms and habitats 
within the site, which includes two of the largest mobile 
sand dune systems in NW Europe, one of which is 
designated as a Site of Special Scientific Interest. The 
RSPB also pointed to the dune habitats, which it argued 
were “outstanding” and which sustained many of animal 
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and plant communities of high biodiversity value. It’s overall 
argument concerned the need to preserve the whole 
ecological community, that is the  sum total of the species 
and their supporting habitat, arguing that this was rare in a 
Scottish, UK and European context and was of high 
scientific value. The RSPB’s evidence can best be 
summed up in the question they posed to the enquiry: 
 
“We should ask ourselves whether serious 
environmental damage and disruption to natural 
processes is a necessary and inevitable 
sacrifice to be paid to achieve perceived 
economic benefits” 
 
What is probably the key point is that part of the 
development area is designated as an SSSI. An SSSI is an 
officially designated area13 (under the Nature Conservation 
(Scotland) Act 2004) and an SSSI designation aims to 
protect “the best of Scotland’s natural heritage14”.  SNH’s 
main concern over the Menie development was that the 
stabilisation work required on the dunes in order to develop 
the golf course would so compromise the natural integrity 
and scientific value of the site that this could result in the 
SSSI designation being withdrawn. 
 
The local council also recognises the importance of SSSI’s. 
The Aberdeenshire Local Plan argues that SSSI’s “are a 
very valuable resource, and therefore need protection 
against damaging development”. Furthermore, the local 
plan also states explicitly that where a development will 
adversely impact on an SSSI, it will: 
 
 “Be refused unless the developer proves that 
any significant adverse effects  on the quality for 
which the area has been designated are clearly 
outweighed by social and economic benefits of 
national importance”15.  
 
The SSSI issue reflects the key problem facing the 
reporters to the Menie Enquiry. This is well expressed in 
the quotation from the RSPB submission above, and can 
be summed up whether the economic benefits that would 
undoubtedly result from the Trump development outweigh 
the environmental cost of the loss of a natural asset? The 
Menie dunes have been designated as an SSSI because, 
in the opinion of the official designating body representing 
the interests of the Scottish population, they are argued to 
be a unique part of Scotland’s natural heritage. The 
proposed development would necessarily mean damage to 
an important natural asset, a point conceded by the 
developers, who accepted that it would result in “significant 
adverse effects on the environment” but argued that these 
would be outweighed by the economic benefits that the 
development would bring.16 
 
The source of the conflict 
SNH also noted that it was the decision by TIGLS to 
develop on the SSSI “which triggers the obvious conflict 
between Mr Trump’s ambitions and the protection of the 
environment in respect of which SNH has a 
responsibility”.17  The enquiry was made aware of 
alternative designs that did not use the SSSI, but the key 
source of conflict remained that, in the opinion of the golf 
course architect,18 it was necessary to use the SSSI part of 
the Menie site - failure to do so would mean that the 
development could not realise the key objective, which is to 
create “a world-class, championship links course, in 
traditional Scottish style, capable of one day hosting a 
major championship”19. In its final submission, TIGLS 
reiterated that creating the world class golf course that it 
envisioned required the SSSI land and that it would prefer 
to withdraw the application if this were not allowed.20 
 
Can we learn anything from policy 
documents? 
Given that there is inevitably a conflict between the 
economic benefits and environmental costs of the 
proposed Menie development, it would be interesting to 
learn whether official policy documents contain any advice 
on how to proceed in the face of such conflicts. 
Unfortunately, this appears not to be the case. For 
example, the most recent official Scottish Government 
document on sustainable development21 contains a good 
deal of material on the quality of Scotland’s natural assets. 
For example: 
 
“Scotland is blessed with some of the world’s 
most precious and special natural environments  
...…. One of our key priorities must be to protect 
those natural resources for the long term and 
strengthen their role as part of  our lives and 
culture”22 
 
Similarly, the imaginatively titled document that outlines 
Scotland’s marine and coastal strategy23 argues that “the 
marine and coastal environments around Scotland are 
vitally important to the sustainable future of our country”. 
Unfortunately however, neither document outlines the 
appropriate action to take in situations where the desire to 
conserve natural resources is in direct conflict with the 
possibility of a substantial economic gain. 
 
How should we make the decision? 
It does appear that the reporters have a difficult decision to 
make. On the one hand there will be a substantial 
economic gain from a project that fits closely with long term 
local development needs. On the other, this will inevitably 
lead to the loss of a natural asset, one which the official 
heritage body considers to be a part of the best of 
Scotland’s natural heritage. How should one be weighed 
against the other? 
 
Clearly, the decision should be made by comparing the 
benefits that result from the development against the costs 
that will ensue. We do have a considerable amount of 
evidence on what the development means to the Scottish 
and local economies - the amount of GVA produced by the 
development measures the economic value created, and 
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so measures what it is “worth”, both across Scotland and 
locally. However, no comparable estimate was available 
about the value of the dunes. Since we have no evidence 
on how people value the natural asset, we have no 
common standard against which to compare costs and 
benefits. 
 
This situation is unfortunate, especially as there are well-
known economic techniques, chief among which is 
Contingent Valuation (CV), that are able to measure the 
value to society of natural resources. CV has the added 
benefit that it estimates a monetary value for the natural 
asset, and so produces a common standard of comparison 
between the economic and environmental consequences 
of a project.  
 
Contingent valuation 
Contingent valuation measures the public’s valuation of a 
natural resource asset. In general terms, the economic 
value to society of any good or service is measured by 
what people are prepared to pay for it. If, for example, 
someone is prepared to pay £1 for a bus journey or £30 for 
a meal, then what the person is prepared to pay measures 
the value that he or she places on that good or service.  
 
The argument that underlies contingent valuation, however, 
is that what people pay to purchase something does not 
necessarily reflect its total value to society - market prices 
do not necessarily reflect the value that individuals (or, by 
aggregation, society as a whole) place on some things. A 
simple example would be where a person values a 
dramatic view of a mountain. As it is not possible to sell the 
view, however, there is no market price and so no market 
valuation of what the view is worth to that person. The 
Menie dunes are clearly another example of this type of 
natural asset. 
 
This problem arises because the mountain view is what is 
known as “non-excludable” – it is either not technically 
possible or it is prohibitively costly to prevent anyone from 
appreciating a particular piece of scenery. Since people 
cannot be prevented from consuming it, it is not possible 
for a company to supply it hence there is no market and no 
price for the asset.  
 
Contingent valuation argues that market prices reflect only 
what are termed “use values”24. Use values reflect what 
people will pay to actually consume (“use”) something such 
as a bus journey. However, natural resource assets may 
also generate so-called non-use values, where people 
value something even if they do not actually consume it 
themselves. Non-use values arise because people may 
value an aspect of some goods that cannot be bought or 
sold through markets for the reasons discussed above. For 
example, people may not actually visit a natural asset but 
may still be willing to pay to have it preserved for the 
following reasons25: 
 
 Existence value – they may feel that  the site is 
worth conserving for its own sake; 
 
 Option value – people may want to leave open the 
possibility that they will visit the site in the future; 
 
 Bequest values – there may be a desire for the 
site to be preserved for future generations. 
The technique thus attempts to estimate the total value of 
an activity to society by estimating both use and non-use 
values. 
 
Information on the amount that people in Scotland would 
spend to preserve the Menie dunes would thus allow us to 
weigh the known value that the Trump development will 
contribute to the Scottish economy - the amount of GVA 
created at Menie - against the value that people in 
Scotland place on preservation of the dunes. The Trump 
development is a classic example of how economic 
development may conflict with a desire to protect the 
environment. Given an increased interest in environmental 
issues, conflicts of this nature are likely to occur again and 
it would be useful if these type of economic valuation 
techniques were applied more widely in the future.  
 
 
____________________ 
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Inside the Scottish 
workplace: employee 
perspectives from the 
2004 Workplace 
Employment 
Relations Survey1  
 
John Sutherland, Centre for Policy for Regions, University 
of Glasgow 
 
 
Employee perspectives of their jobs, their managers and 
management-employee relationships at their places of 
work are important for two reasons. First, they help explain 
the current behaviour of some workers, such as lateness, 
absenteeism, or shirking on the job, all contributing to low 
worker productivity. Secondly, they help predict the future 
behaviour of all workers, notably their likelihood of quitting 
their present job. 
 
This paper reports research which examined five sets of 
perspectives of workers employed at workplaces located in 
Scotland viz. (i.) about their jobs, and the various demands 
these jobs make on them; (ii.) about the influence they 
have over various facets of their jobs, their task discretion; 
(iii.) about the satisfaction they derive from several aspects 
of their jobs; (iv.) about their managers at their places of 
work; and (v.) about management-employee relationships, 
again at their places of work. 2 
 
The research made use of matched workplace-employee 
data sets which had their origin in two surveys associated 
with the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS 2004) viz. the survey of managers and the survey 
of employees (Kersley et al, 2006). The initial unit of 
analysis in WERS 2004 is the workplace, defined as the 
activities of a single employer at a single set of premises. 
At each participating workplace, the manager with day to 
day responsibilities for employment was interviewed, and 
this constitutes the survey of managers. At each workplace 
which participated in the survey of managers, self 
completion questionnaires were distributed to a random 
selection of up to 25 employees, and this constitutes the 
survey of employees.   
 
This paper has three aims. First, to report responses to 
questions of relevance in the survey of employees. For 
example reporting how many employees agree with the 
statement that ‘my job requires that I work very hard’?: how 
many are satisfied with the sense of achievement they get 
from their jobs?: and how many would describe 
management-employee relations where they work as 
‘good’? Responses to these questions vary, between 
individuals and across places of work. The second aim is to 
report how these responses differ, for example according 
to individual personal characteristics and the 
characteristics of the workplaces at which the individual is 
employed.  
 
The WERS 2004 survey is undertaken throughout Great 
Britain. Consequently, it is possible to compare the 
responses made by individuals employed at workplaces 
located in Scotland with their counterparts employed at 
workplaces located elsewhere in Great Britain. Accordingly, 
the third aim of the paper is to report the extent to which 
the perspectives of employees in Scottish based 
workplaces are ‘different’. This final aim is especially 
important , following recent research by Bell and 
Blanchflower (2007) who argued that “the Scots are less 
happy and less satisfied with life than is the case for the 
British population as a whole” (p. 189). 
 
The remainder of this paper is in four substantive sections. 
The following section provides a descriptive overview of 
employee responses to ten questions used to examine the 
five sets of perspectives identified above. Then important, 
illustrative examples are provided of how responses to 
these questions differ, according to individual personal 
characteristics, such as age, gender, training received, and 
the characteristics of the workplace at which the individual 
is employed, especially whether or not it is a single 
establishment organisation. Differences in perspectives 
between those employed at workplaces located in Scotland 
and those employed at workplaces located elsewhere in 
Great Britain are then reported. The final section addresses 
some policy implications which arise from the principal 
conclusions of the research.   
 
The work-related perspectives of employees 
in Scotland 
The work-related perspectives of individuals employed in 
workplaces located in Scotland are reported, by question 
posed in the WERS 2004 survey of employees, in Tables 1 
through to 10. (The perspectives of those employed in 
workplaces located elsewhere in Great Britain are given in 
parentheses.)   
 
Although most employees agree that their jobs require 
them to work very hard, most feel that their jobs are secure 
and very few worry a lot about their jobs outside working 
hours (Table 1). The majority feel that their jobs make them 
feel ‘tense’, ‘worried’ and ‘uneasy’ ‘occasionally’ or ‘some 
of the time’ (Table 2). On the other hand, approximately 
one individual in four feels that his/her job makes him/her 
feel ‘calm’, ‘relaxed’ and ‘content’ ‘most of the time’ (Table 
3). 
 
One employee in three claims to have ‘a lot’ of influence 
over what tasks he/she does and the pace at which he/she 
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works. Almost one in two claims to have ‘a lot’ of influence 
over how he/she does the work and the order in which 
work is carried out. However, over one in three has no 
control over his/her start/finishing times (Table 4). 
 
Most employees are satisfied with most aspects of their 
work, for example the sense of achievement got from it; 
and the scope it offers to make use of their own initiative. 
Where less satisfaction is to be found, it is in the context of 
the training received and, most especially, the pay received 
(Table 5).   
 
Although more employees consider their managers to be 
‘good’ rather than ‘poor’ at informing them about issues 
such as changes in the way the organisation is being run or 
changes in the way in which the job is to be done, 
nonetheless a sizeable minority feel otherwise (Table 6). 
Similar response outcomes are to be seen in the context of 
statements such as: agreeing that their managers can be 
relied upon to keep their promises; deal with their 
employees fairly; and are understanding about their out of 
work responsibilities (Table 7). 
 
More employees agree than disagree with the statement 
that their managers are ‘good’ at seeking the views of 
themselves or their representatives or responding to 
suggestions from the same. However, more disagree than 
agree with the statement that their workplace managers 
are ‘good’ at allowing themselves or their representatives 
to influence final decisions (Table 8). This latter result is 
reflected in Table 9, which reports percentage responses to 
the question about employee satisfaction with the amount 
of involvement in decision-making. Nonetheless, the 
majority maintain that relations between managers and 
employees at their places of work are ‘good’ (Table 10).  
 
Some differences in the work-related 
perspectives of employees in Scotland 
Responses to the questions/statements from the survey of 
employees constitute the dependent variables in the 
estimations undertaken to examine the determinants of 
differences in the work-related perspectives identified. 
These responses are multiple, nominal and, sometimes, 
ordered. Consequently, as appropriate, multinomial logit 
and ordered logit models are estimated. The vector of 
independent variables consists of responses to some 
further questions from the survey of employees together 
with responses to selected questions from  the survey of 
managers. This vector, which remains constant throughout, 
irrespective of whether the model estimated is a 
multinomial logit or an ordered logit, consists of three 
distinct types of variables. The first type reflects an 
individual’s personal characteristics, both unrelated to and 
related to the workplace at which he/she is employed (for 
example, age/gender and tenure, respectively); the second 
type reflects the structural characteristics of the workplace 
at which the individual is employed (such as its size, its 
corporate characteristics, its Standard Industrial 
Classification etc.); and the third type reflects some of the 
human resource management policies and practices in 
operation at the workplace at which the individual is 
employed (such as whether the workplace is Investors in 
People accredited, whether it has an equal opportunities 
policy etc.)3 
 
Variables proxying age, earnings and educational 
qualifications are positively correlated with most aspects of 
job satisfaction, with the older, those earning relatively 
more and those without educational qualifications being 
more likely to report that they derive satisfaction from their 
work. Moreover, the significance of these same three 
variables extends further into some of the other 
perspectives examined, although the nature of their impact 
there differs. For example, whereas those in the older age 
categories and those without educational qualifications are 
correlated with positive feelings about their work – such as 
being relaxed and content – those in the higher earnings 
categories are correlated with agreeing with statements 
such as their jobs require them to work very hard and 
worrying a lot about their jobs outside working hours.  
 
Women are more likely than men to report job satisfaction 
across its several aspects. Gender, however, proves to be 
of little significance in the context of the other four sets of 
perspectives examined.    
 
The amount of training received in the past 12 months is 
the most important of all the variables designed to depict 
an individual’s job related characteristics in explaining the 
different perspectives held. Those who have had between 
two and five days or more training in the past year, relative 
to those who have had no training whatsoever, do report 
some negative perspectives. For example, their jobs 
require them to work very hard; they never have enough 
time to get their jobs finished; and they tend to worry a lot 
about their jobs outside of working hours. More generally, 
however, their perspectives are positive, again relative to 
those who have had no training, not only about matters 
pertaining to their own jobs, but also about managers at 
their places of work. To illustrate: they are more likely to 
have more influence over all facets of job influence 
examined; they are more likely to derive satisfaction from 
six of the seven aspects examined – the exception is pay 
received; they are more positive about their workplace 
managers and of management-employee relationships at 
their places of work, notably so on matters relating to their 
involvement in decision-making.  
 
A feature of  previous studies of individuals at their places 
of work is the identification of what Noon and Hoque (2001) 
refer to as “the persistence of unequal treatment at work” 
(p. 105). Despite legislation post 1998 which seeks to 
address and remedy much of this, the research presents 
evidence of continuing perceptions of inequality on the part 
of some members of the workforce, notably those who are 
disabled; those who are not ‘white’; and those who are 
working on part time/fixed term/temporary contracts of 
employment.     
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When compared to those who report no disability, those 
with some form of disability are less likely to consider their 
jobs to be secure; are more likely to feel tense; and less 
likely to feel calm. They are less likely to be satisfied with 
the jobs they do and the pay they get from doing them. 
They are less likely to agree with the statement that 
managers treat their employees fairly.  
 
When compared to those who are white, individuals who 
are not white are more likely to be dissatisfied with the 
scope they have to make use of their own initiative; the 
influence they have over their jobs; the training they 
receive; and their pay. They are less likely to be satisfied 
with the work itself. Furthermore, individuals who are not 
white are more likely to consider their managers to be poor 
at seeking the views of employees or their representatives; 
and to be poor at allowing either to have some influence on 
decision-making. They are also more likely to be 
dissatisfied with their own involvement in decision-making.  
 
When compared to those working on ‘normal’ full time 
contracts of employment, those with temporary contracts 
are less likely to feel that their jobs are secure, sentiments 
shared with those on fixed term contracts. Additionally, 
they are more likely to be dissatisfied with the sense of 
achievement they get from their jobs; and are more likely to 
be dissatisfied with the scope they have to make use of 
their own initiative, sentiments also held by those on fixed 
term contracts. Finally, those on temporary contracts are 
more likely to disagree with the statement that managers 
treat their employees fairly; and they are less likely to 
agree that management-employee relations at their places 
of work are good. 
 
Variables depicting the structural characteristics of the 
workplace at which the individual is employed are not 
without some consequence, notably so for the variables 
associated with single/multi-workplace nature of the 
organisation. Relative to those employed at single plant 
organisations, individuals employed at workplaces which 
are part of multi-workplace organisations are less likely to 
be satisfied with their job security. Also, they are more 
likely to be dissatisfied with matters relating to the scope 
they have to make use of their own initiative and their pay.  
 
Perhaps most important of all, however, is their indictment 
of managers at their places of work. Again relative to those 
employed at single plant organisations, individuals 
employed at workplaces which are part of multi-workplace 
organisations are more likely to disagree with such 
statements as: managers keep their word;  managers are 
sincere when attempting to understand employees’ views; 
managers deal with employees honestly; and managers 
are understanding about employees’ out of work 
responsibilities. This carries over into their perspectives of 
management-employee relations at their place of work, 
where individuals employed at workplaces which are part 
of multi-workplace organisations are critical of their (lack of) 
involvement in decision-making and consider 
management-employee relations to be poor.       
  
Differences between the perspectives of 
individuals employed in workplaces located 
in Scotland and those employed in 
workplaces located elsewhere in Great 
Britain 
The work-related perspectives of individuals employed in 
workplaces located outwith Scotland, i.e. elsewhere in 
Great Britain, are reported in parentheses, by question 
posed in the WERS 2004 survey of employees, in Tables 1 
through to 10. Casual observation of these tables suggests 
little difference between their perspectives and those of 
their counterparts employed in workplaces located in 
Scotland.4 
 
However, replicating the original multinomial logit and 
ordered logit estimations, this time making use of the full 
data set and incorporating a dummy variable to distinguish 
between ‘Scotland’ and the ‘Rest of Great Britain’, makes it 
possible to examine for possible differences controlling for 
the other factors included in the vector of independent 
variables in the models. In the 37 estimations associated 
with the original analysis, there are only three instances in 
which there is a statistically significant (i.e. at a 95 percent 
confidence level) difference between the two groups of 
workers. Only one of these is a matter of some substance 
viz. satisfaction with pay received.5 In the context of this 
aspect of job satisfaction, individuals employed at 
workplaces located elsewhere in Great Britain are less 
likely to be satisfied with the pay they receive, relative, that 
is, to their counterparts employed in Scottish based 
workplaces. 
   
These effectively negligible differences in work-related 
perspectives between workers employed at workplaces 
located in Scotland and those employed at workplaces 
located elsewhere in Great Britain contrast markedly with 
the research findings of Bell and Blanchflower (2007). 
Analysing a diverse set of data bases to examine an 
equally diverse range of objective and subjective indicators 
of health, welfare and well-being, Bell and Blanchflower 
paint “a relatively depressing picture of Scotland” (p. 192) 
in which Scotland consistently compares unfavourably with, 
for example, the rest of Great Britain. Bell and Blanchflower 
conclude that: “Economic factors are likely only to make a 
difference at the margin to these welfare outcomes.” (p. 
192). As a consequence, they question the high priority 
accorded to the policy objective of economic growth on the 
part of the Scottish Executive (as was), advocating that 
higher priority be given instead to more ‘social’ and ‘health’ 
orientated policies.6    
 
 
Some policy implications of the research 
This paper has reported research which examined five sets 
of work-related perspectives of individuals employed at 
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workplaces located in Scotland. Three results are 
particularly noteworthy, each with policy significance. 
2The research is reported in full in the Centre for Public Policy for 
Regions (CPPR) Working Paper No. 15, available from the CPPR 
website (www.cppr.ac.uk).  
Training is found to be correlated with positive outcomes, 
relating both to an individual’s personal job satisfaction and 
well-being at work and his/her perspective of managers 
and management-employee relations at his/her place of 
work. Training is integral to the battery of organisational 
policies associated with high commitment management, a 
strategy advocated because of its putative positive impact 
upon organisational performance (Walton, 1985). It is 
inappropriate to presume causation where no evidence of 
such exists. Training may not necessarily engender 
commitment which, in its turn, may not necessarily 
enhance organisational performance. Nonetheless, this 
research offers further supportive evidence of the apparent 
benefits to both individuals and organisations which may 
accrue from investments in human capital.     
 
3Full details of these independent variables, most incorporated for 
purposes of control, are available from the original working paper. 
The estimating assumption is that these variables are exogenous, 
an assumption frequently made in other comparable estimations 
(e.g. Bell and Blanchflower,  
 
4By way of a preliminary examination of the data set to test for 
possible statistical associations between the two sets of variables 
of relevance, each question/statement response was cross 
tabulated by the ‘Scotland’ –‘Rest of Great Britain’ dummy 
variables. Pearson chi-square statistics established a statistically 
significant association (at p < 0.05) between the ‘Scotland’ and 
‘Rest of Great Britain’ dummy variables and responses to the 
following questions: “thinking about the past few weeks, how much 
of the time has your job made you feel ‘relaxed’ ”? (p = 0.031): “in 
general, how much influence do you have over ‘the order in which 
you carry out tasks’ ”? (p = 0.035): “how satisfied are you with ‘the 
scope for using your own initiative’ ”? (p = 0.029): “how satisfied 
are you with ‘the amount of influence you have over your job’ ”? (p 
= 0.028):  and “how satisfied are you with ‘the amount of pay you 
receive’ ”? (p = 0.001). Again, see the original working paper for 
fuller details.   2007). 
 
Perceptions of workplace inequalities exist on the part of 
minority groups. This does not necessarily imply that 
existing policies, towards equal opportunities and flexible 
working, for example, are not working. There may be 
problems of policy compliance. However, there may be 
also some requirement to strengthen existing policies of 
relevance. 
 
 
Contrary to the “relatively depressing picture of Scotland” 
presented by Bell and Blanchflower (2007, p. 192), there is 
very little difference in the work-related perspectives 
examined between those employed at workplaces located 
in Scotland and their counterparts employed elsewhere 
within Great Britain. Moreover, in the single instance of 
substance where a difference is found, it is not those 
employed within Scotland who voice their dissatisfaction. In 
their assessment of policy requirements given the manifold 
problems which Bell and Blanchflower examine, they treat 
employment policy with some disdain, favouring instead 
more socially orientated strategies. However, given the 
findings of the research reported in this paper, perhaps the 
potential of appropriate employment policies is due more 
credit than they give. Although not necessarily reducing or 
eliminating individual differences in well-being at work, 
being employed would appear to eliminate many of the 
spatial differences in well-being they observe.   
5.The other two instances relate to worrying a lot about the job 
outside working hours and influence over starting and finishing 
times. 
 
6The priority accorded to economic growth has not changed, 
despite the regime change in the Scottish Parliament and the 
presence, now, of a Scottish National Party ‘Scottish Government’ 
(Scottish Government, 2007). 
 
____________________ 
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Table 1:  Perspectives about the job (A) 
 
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement about your job: (net percentage agreement 
scores) (Rest of Great Britain (GB) in parentheses) 
Statement Percent 
  
My work requires that I work very hard   72.46  (71.46) 
I never seem to have enough time to get my work done 15.23  (15.17) 
I feel that my job is secure in this workplace 49.17  (47.08) 
I worry a lot about my work outside working hours -20.71  (-21.62) 
Number of observations 1,202  (9,453) 
 
Note: The ‘net percentage agreement score’ is obtained by subtracting the percentage who disagree with the statement from the percentage 
who agree with the statement.    
 
 
Table 2:  Perspectives about the job (B) 
 
Question: Thinking about the past few weeks, how much of the time has your job made you feel ‘Tense’, ‘Worried’, 
‘Uneasy’ (percent of time): (Rest of GB in parentheses):  
Response (Percent)\Feeling Tense Worried Uneasy 
    
Never 11.90 (9.88) 19.38 (18.14) 26.12 (27.30) 
Occasionally 26.46 (27.42) 31.28 (32.19) 34.78 (33.21) 
Some of the time 43.09 (43.88) 38.60 (37.66) 31.20 (29.47) 
Most of the time 15.81 (15.51)   9.15 (9.99)   6.14 (8.08) 
All of the time   2.75 (3.31)   1.58 (2.02)   1.50 (1.94) 
Number of observations 1,202 (9,453) 
 
Table 3:  Perspectives about the job (C) 
 
Question: Thinking about the past few weeks, how much of the time has your job made you feel ‘Calm’, ‘Relaxed’, 
‘Content (percent of the time): (Rest of GB in parentheses): 
Response (Percent)\Feeling Calm Relaxed Content 
    
Never 12.40 (10.48) 20.05 (9.95) 12.06 (10.47) 
Occasionally 27.29 (28.59) 30.28 (30.74) 23.29 (22.62) 
Some of the time 29.45 (30.05) 24.29 (27.97) 28.95 (30.56) 
Most of the time 28.89 (28.57) 23.71 (21.45) 32.95 (32.50) 
All of the time   2.00 (2.30)   1.66 (1.88)   2.75 (3.85) 
Number of observations 1,202 (9,453) 
 
Table 4:  Perspectives about influence over facets of the job 
 
Question: In general, how much influence do you have over the following, (Percent) (Rest of GB in parentheses): 
Facet\Response (Percent) None A Little Some A Lot Total 
      
What tasks you do 12.15 
(10.57) 
15.14 
(14.45) 
38.19 
(34.53) 
34.53 
(35.53) 
1,202 
(9,453) 
The pace at which you work 11.23 
(10.94) 
15.81 
(15.35) 
38.02 
(35.96) 
34.94 
(37.76) 
1,202 
(9,453) 
How you do your work 4.49 
(3.65) 
11.23 
(10.90) 
35.27 
(34.38) 
48.00 
(51.07) 
1,202 
(9,453) 
The order in which you carry out tasks 6.74 
(5.18) 
9.48 
(11.05) 
35.27 
(33.66) 
48.50 
(50.10) 
1,202 
(9,453) 
The time you start or finish work 37.35 
(33.70) 
14.98 
(16.04) 
22.05 
(24.10) 
25.62 
(26.16) 
1,202 
(9,453) 
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Table 5:  Perspectives about the satisfaction derived from aspects of the job 
 
Question: How satisfied are you with the following, (percent) (net percentage satisfaction scores) (Rest of GB in 
parentheses): 
Aspect Percent 
  
The sense of achievement you get from your work 55.57  (60.12) 
The scope for using your own initiative 56.99  (61.93) 
The amount of influence you have over your job 38.11  (44.10) 
The training you receive 21.88  (25.13) 
The amount of pay you receive 0.42  (-7.08) 
Your job security 48.17  (46.20) 
The work itself 58.49  (61.97) 
Number of observations 1,202  (9,453) 
 
Note: The ‘net percentage satisfaction score’ is obtained by subtracting the percentage who are dissatisfied with the aspect in question from the 
percentage who are satisfied.    
 
 
 
Table 6:  Perspectives about management 
 
Question: In general, how good would you say managers at this workplace are at keeping employees informed 
about: (percent) (net percentage ‘good’ scores) (Rest of GB in parentheses): 
Issue Percent 
  
Changes to the way the organisation is being run 23.21  (23.67) 
Changes in staffing 13.15  (15.73) 
Changes in the way you do your job 26.54  (26.00) 
Financial matters, including budgets and profits 4.74   (9.54) 
Number of observations 1,202  (9,453) 
 
Note: The ‘net percentage good score’ is obtained by subtracting the percentage who report management are good with the issue in question 
from the percentage who report that management are poor.    
 
 
 
Table 7:  Perspectives about management 
 
Question: Thinking about the managers at this workplace, to what extent do you agree or disagree that they: 
(percent) (net percentage ‘agreement’ scores) (Rest of GB in parentheses): 
Issue Percent 
  
Can be relied upon to keep their promise 19.47  (17.89) 
Are sincere in attempting to understand employees’  
Views 
25.54  (27.67) 
Deal with employees honestly 29.62  (30.86) 
Understand about employees having to meet responsibilities  
outside work 
35.85  (36.23) 
Encourage people to develop their skills 38.85  (38.88) 
Treat employees fairly 32.53  (32.09) 
Number of observations 1,202  (9,453) 
 
Note: The ‘net percentage agreement score’ is obtained by subtracting the percentage who disagree with the statement from the percentage 
who agree with the statement.   
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Table 8:  Perspectives about management-employee relations (A) 
 
Question: Overall, how good would you say managers at this workplace are at: (percent), (net percentage ‘good’ 
scores) (Rest of GB in parentheses): 
Issue Percent 
  
Seeking the views of employees or employee  
Representatives 
15.97  (15.99) 
Responding to suggestions from employees or  
employee representatives 
9.23  (9.84) 
Allowing employees or employee representatives  
to influence final decisions 
-10.24  (-7.69) 
Number of observations 1,202  (9,453) 
 
Note: The ‘net percentage good score’ is obtained by subtracting the percentage who report management are good at the issue in question from 
the percentage who report that management are poor.    
 
 
Table 9:  Perspectives about management-employee relations (B) 
 
Question: Overall, how satisfied are you with the amount of involvement you have in decision-making at this 
workplace? (percent) (Rest of GB in parentheses): 
Response Percent 
  
Dissatisfied 25.12  (23.57) 
Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied 37.10  (37.12) 
Satisfied 37.77  (39.23) 
Number of observations 1,202  (9,453) 
 
 
Table 10:  Perspectives about management-employee relations (C) 
 
Question: In general, how would you describe relations between managers and employees here? (percent) (Rest 
of GB in parentheses): 
Response Percent 
  
Poor 18.05  (16.59) 
Neither poor nor good 26.21  (24.85) 
Good 55.74  (68.55) 
Number of observations 1,202  (9,453) 
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